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“What remains constant is better than that which is changeable.”  







An education is a quest for truth. In classroom discussions, meetings with 
professors, or readings of classic works of literature, one’s time at a university is a 
journey to identify, question, critique, and formulate those principles that comprise the 
truth. During this intellectual odyssey, I came across two particular figures who 
themselves offer unique conceptions of the truth in the natural law tradition: Dean 
Clarence Manion of Notre Dame Law School and Robert P. George of Princeton 
University. Both writing as Catholic conservatives in post-War America, these two men 
have similar foundations for their natural law theories.  Yet the conclusions they draw 
about the natural law and the implications they suggest are vastly different, if not 
diametrically opposed. Because of the evolving political and social circumstances in the 
last sixty years, they call upon the natural law as a base for divergent social and political 
motives. My task is to analyze, compare, and contrast the natural law philosophies of 
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Dean Manion and Professor George in light of the specific political and culture milieu in 
which they wrote and determine if either natural law framework is viable in 
contemporary America. The experiences of Manion and George are different, and the 
conclusions they draw from the natural law are also distinctive. Yet for each, the natural 
law is a source of fixed truth in a world of change that ought to guide individuals and 
government policy.  
The role of the natural law in government raises distinctive difficulties in the 
context of American politics. As a pluralistic society that lauds “the marketplace of 
ideas” and shies away from rigid doctrine, America is at odds with certain views of the 
natural law. I will explore these difficulties throughout the paper, and they are central to 
the divergence between Manion and George.  At the end of the project, I attempt to 
determine which, if either, of these two natural law frameworks can be reconciled with 
contemporary America.   
 I will begin with a brief analysis of what is meant when we refer to “the natural 
law.” After a year of reading specifically on this topic, I am quite convinced that writings 
on the natural law may be the least “fixed” of all academic subjects. Various 
philosophers, theologians, politicians, academics, and indeed entire schools of thought 
have defined the natural law in different, sometimes conflicting ways. Section One of this 
paper, then, is an attempt to clarify this ambiguity by offering a brief explanation of the 
natural law while presenting an all-too-short and inadequate survey of its historical 
development.  
Central to this survey is the Catholic heritage of the natural law. Although it has 
clear pre-Christian roots, the natural law has been most energetically defended by 
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Catholic thinkers. Foremost among these thinkers is St. Thomas Aquinas. Most 
contemporary debates on the natural law today are an attempt to assert the true 
“Thomistic” principles outlined by the thirteenth-century Dominican priest. Both Manion 
and George work in this Catholic heritage, themselves both devout Catholics who 
consider faith central to the human experience.  
 One key question that emerges at this point is perhaps the fundamental challenge 
to the natural law tradition. Does the fact that the term – which ostensibly refers to certain 
unchanging laws laid down by nature – has been interpreted and employed differently 
throughout human history compromise the legitimacy of the natural law’s very existence? 
If nothing else, the diversity of causes for the natural law’s invocation as well as the 
varied interpretations of its precepts ought to caution us when we come across the term 
and, of course, when we use it ourselves.  
 The other angle of this paper examines the political expedience of the natural law. 
Framing the question more narrowly, based on the current state of American politics and 
culture, can we reconcile the use of a natural law framework in our policymaking 
process? There are evident political difficulties with relying on the natural law for the 
basis of lawmaking, and I will explore these more thoroughly at the end of Section One.  
 Because, as I acknowledge, the natural law tradition is long and complex, I will 
narrow my analysis of it to the writings of Dean Manion and Professor George. In 
Section Two, I further introduce these two preeminent intellectuals and offer some 
perspective on the magnitude of the role they played and the influence they continue to 
have in shaping the natural law in American politics and culture.  
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 Section Three begins by analyzing more directly the natural law teachings of 
Clarence Manion. Manion’s political mindset was shaped by the experience of the World 
Wars and the nascent fight against communism. His central thesis is that the natural law 
is the last best hope in protecting individual liberty in the face of tyranny of all forms. 
Fundamental to his argument from the perspective of an American political framework is 
his connection of the natural law to the nation’s founding. The end of Section Three 
documents Manion’s position that, in its role as protector of American liberty, the natural 
law is fundamentally based in the original values of the American Revolution.  
 In Sections Four and Five, I turn to Robert P. George’s view of the natural law 
and explore its concrete implications. George is currently the leading scholar in the “new 
natural law tradition.”1 This oxymoronic school is wholly unique to Manion’s more 
rudimentary conception of the natural law. In Section Four, I discuss the consequences of 
George’s new natural law theory and consider his views on public morality. To clarify 
George’s positions, I offer a more thorough look at the precepts that underlie the new 
natural law theory in Section Five.  
Section Six is an exploration of the key differences between Manion and George. 
Considering both their substantive and stylistic differences, this section makes clear how, 
although both men claim to work from the same foundation, their methods and 
conclusions are quite distinctive. The differences include variations in opinion on direct 
                                                
1 Throughout this paper, I will omit the adjective “old” when I refer to Manion’s natural 
law principles. I will introduce and unpack the theories of the new natural law by 
including the adjective “new.” By identifying George and his colleagues as “new” natural 
lawyers, I merely intend to classify their work. As new natural lawyers claim, their goal 
is not to invent anything new, but to refine and revive the natural law tradition of St. 
Thomas as it was originally intended, in the process giving it new depth, new force, and 
new relevancy. 
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appeals to divine authority as opposed to a focus on reason, and contrasting visions on the 
proper role of government.  
 In Section Seven, I conclude the analysis by offering some summary remarks and 
attempting to reconcile the natural law views of Manion and George with each other and 
with American politics in general. Intersecting at the points of human dignity and human 
freedom, the natural law philosophies of Manion and George may actually complement 
one another and not stand in opposition. It is our freedom that contributes to our human 
dignity, yet our human dignity as rational creatures who can deliberate, judge, and choose 
our actions and life plan that gives us our freedom. And this complementary (although 
somewhat paradoxical) relationship is at the intersection of the natural law philosophies 
of Manion and George. This relationship is also best fulfilled in a liberal democracy 
where individuals have the freedom to exercise their ability to deliberate rationally – both 
individually and collectively – on personal and social questions.  
The natural law purports to provide an objective framework by which we can 
ensure our dignity, protect our liberty, form a coherent life plan, avoid arbitrary 
preferences among values or persons, behave rationally and morally, and foster the 
common good.  Yet applied politically in the public sphere, it bites with such strength 
that it threatens some of these very qualities.  A study of the works of Dean Clarence 
Manion and Professor Robert P. George makes clear these difficulties with the natural 
law, while at the same time offering an insight on how an adherence to a particular view 






I: What is Natural Law? A Brief History of the Natural Law with a Focus on its 
Catholic Heritage and a Survey of its Political Difficulties  
 
 
Unchanging laws govern everything in the world. When a person drops a pencil, 
he fully expects that it will fall to the ground, and 100 percent of the time, it will. 
Similarly, combining two hydrogen molecules with an oxygen molecule will produce the 
compound of water.  These laws of nature are unwavering and apply absolutely. As one 
of the leading contemporary natural law scholars, Notre Dame Law Professor Charles 
Rice succinctly notes, “the natural law is the story of how things work.”2  And as the two 
previous examples show, when speaking of the physical world and the natural (physical) 
laws that govern it, the laws seem self-evident. Natural law, however, is not confined to 
laws of physics or chemistry. It also applies to the moral world. In fact, Thomas Jefferson 
used the same term, “self-evident,” to describe the natural law guarantee that certain 
rights of men could not be justly infringed upon.3  One would not find laws in a physics 
textbook that claim that all men are created equal and endowed with certain unalienable 
rights, but to Jefferson, these truths are as obvious as saying “what goes up must come 
down.” Likewise, just as it is clear to us that hydrogen and oxygen combine to form 
water, it is also apparent that killing an innocent person is morally wrong. Whether 
applied to the physical or the moral dimensions of our world, natural laws exist and 
command our respect. 
Yet for many contemporary students of the natural law, the term that supposedly 
refers to objective truths that govern man’s personal conduct and interpersonal relations 
                                                
2 Rice, Charles. 50 Questions on the Natural Law: What It Is and Why We Need It. (San 
Francisco, C.A.: Ignatius Press, 1999), 30.  
3 Declaration of Independence 
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is difficult to define. The esoteric precepts of the natural law can be seen as evidence 
against its universality and its supposed accessibility through reason.  To shed some light 
on this, I will outline a brief history of the teaching, for the mere purpose of providing a 
context for my subsequent exploration of two distinct contemporary formulations of the 
natural law.  
 Although natural law theory in contemporary debates is framed as a 
predominately Catholic theory created by social conservatives, the idea of an overarching 
moral code that governs the actions of individuals and states is not particular to Catholic 
dogmatic teaching – and certainly was not created in our time. Predating Jesus by a half 
of a millennium, the Greek playwright Sophocles wrote Antigone, a play in which the 
title character was portrayed as justified in breaking the law of the king of Thebes, Creon. 
When asked for the reason why she chose not to follow the law, Antigone retorts that she  
“did not believe that Zeus was the one who had proclaimed it; neither did Justice, 
or the gods of the dead whom Justice lives among. The laws they have made for 
men are well marked out. I didn’t suppose [the king’s] decree had strength enough 
to violate the lawful traditions the gods have not written merely, but made 
infallible. These laws are not for now or for yesterday, they are alive forever…”4 
Aristotle, a century and a half later, also noted that there are general laws which 
are “based upon nature. In fact, there is a general idea of just and unjust in accordance 
with nature, as all men in a manner divine, even if there is neither communication nor 
agreement between them.” The passage continues with Aristotle arguing against killing 
                                                
4 Sophocles, Antigone. Ed. Richard Emil Braun. (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University 
Press, 1990), 38-39. 
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the innocent in all circumstances, for such an action is not right for some and wrong for 
others, “but a universal precept, which extends without a break throughout the wide-
ruling sky and the boundless earth.”5 
Still writing before the birth of Jesus, the Roman orator Cicero declared that 
“right is based, not upon men’s opinions, but upon Nature.”6 For all of these great 
thinkers – many of whom laid the groundwork for Western culture and modern 
understandings of justice – the fact that there were unchanging laws of nature (that could 
even be justified as cause for counteracting laws of the state), known by men throughout 
the world, was unmistakable.i  
As the above passages show, belief in the natural law is not peculiar to religion in 
general, and certainly not to contemporary conservative Christianity.  Yet, despite its 
evident pre-Catholic heritage, the natural law has been most fully expounded upon by 
Catholic thinkers. The natural law, as Charles Rice reminds us, although knowable by 
reason just like the laws of physics, “make little sense if one is unable to identify the 
lawgiver and the purpose of that law.”7 For this reason, it makes sense to understand the 
natural law in the context of revealed religion. The two types of law – the law of nature 
and the law of God – stand together, united, above the legal positivism of man-made law. 
The foremost authority on the relationship between natural law and divine law is Thomas 
Aquinas, who, in his Summa Theologica, wrote a Treatise on Law in which he laid out 
                                                
5 Aristotle, Rhetoric, at 1373b.  In Freese. J. H., ed. Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 22, 
(Cambridge, M.A., Harvard University Press), 1926.  
6 M. Cicero. In Morris, C.  Laws, in the Great Legal Philosophers. (Philadelphia, P.A.: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1959).  
7 Rice, Charles. "Some Reasons for a Restoration of Natural Law Jurisprudence," 24 
Wake Forest Law Review, (1989), 556.  
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what is perhaps the most sophisticated case for the existence of the natural law and our 
subsequent reliance upon it.  
 St. Thomas, a thirteenth-century Dominican priest, is the foremost authority on 
the natural law. His philosophy has directly impacted Catholic doctrine and, more 
generally, Western thought, and his writings on the natural law continue to be the source 
of debate among contemporary theorists.  Thomas focuses on reason, noting how the 
peculiar rationality of man gives him insight into the Divine will, or the natural law.  He 
argues that man, as a rational creature, “is subject to Divine providence in the most 
excellent way, in so far as [he] partakes of a share of providence, by being provident for 
[himself] and for others.”8 A rational creature “has a share of the Eternal Reason, 
whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper act and end: and this participation of the 
eternal law in the rational creature is called the natural law.”9 
Thomas expounds on his rationality-based theory of natural law as man’s 
participation in the divine or eternal law, deriving his first precept of the natural law as a 
principle that he argues is based in man’s rationality. Quite simply, the natural law tells 
us that, as a rule of reason, good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided.10 
For Thomas (and as we will see, for the new natural lawyers like Robert George), the 
discussion of what is good is intricately related to a creature’s natural end. The things 
toward which man has a rational inclination are naturally comprehended by our reason as 
being “good” and worthy of pursuit. Thomas suggests the following ends (or “goods”) as 
examples:  the pursuit of happiness, the preservation of life, the preservation of our 
                                                
8 Aquinas, St. Thomas. Summa Theologica. (New York, N.Y.: Benzinger Bros., 1948), 
q.92, a. 2.  
9 Aquinas, St. Thomas. Summa Theologica, q.91 a.2.  
10 Aquinas, St. Thomas. Summa Theologica, q. 92, a. 2. 
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species through sexual union and procreation, education, life in society, and knowledge 
of the truth.11 In short, Thomas argues that all “applications of natural law are based upon 
this:  so that whatever the practical reason naturally apprehends as man’s good (or evil) 
belongs to the precepts of the natural law as something to be done or avoided.”12 
Understood in this Thomistic framework, there is little that can be said against the 
natural law as a basis for personal conduct. Even the relativist could concede that willing 
individuals can choose to incorporate the natural law into their lives as a basis for moral 
decision-making. When extrapolated to the level of lawmaking or social governing, 
however, the natural law poses several difficulties. (Although I will not address these 
objections here, a natural law adherent would likely have a strong retort to each of the 
following points.)  
First, as any unchanging standard suggests, there is a certain rigidity to the natural 
law. As a matter of practicality, a lawmaker or judge, for instance, could be easily 
targeted for supporting an “unchanging,” “unwavering,” and “fixed” set of rules. In a 
political climate that is averse to ideologues of any political bent, the natural law devotee 
at the very least leaves himself open to such accusations. Secondly, and conversely, 
although some accuse natural law philosophers of being too rigid, others claim that the 
natural law leaves too much to interpretation. Just as the constitutional originalist who 
claims that he is following dictates of the country’s Founders often faces criticism from 
those who claim he reads his own biases into vague provisions of the Constitution, the 
natural law adherent also hears accusations that he is using natural law dictates to justify 
                                                
11 c.f.  Summa, q. 94, a. 2 and keep these in mind when considering the “basic human 
goods” of Grisez, Finnis, and George in Section Five.  
12 Aquinas, St. Thomas. Summa Theologica, q. 94, a. 2.  
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his own political objectives. Thirdly, although the natural law is purported to be 
accessible through pure reason – divorced from a particular religious heritage – it does 
have strong ties to Catholic doctrine. In a country that– for better or for worse – has 
erected a “wall of separation” between church and state, such ties fly in the face of 
political sensibilities. Moreover, even if we concede that there is no religious necessity to 
the natural law, it places great confidence in human reason, perhaps overlooking certain 
irrational or evil tendencies in human nature (i.e. original sin). There are extreme 
examples of entire groups of people doing exceedingly strange and horrible things that 
fly in the face of reason, such as cannibalism or ritualized killing of the young. But in 
many of these cases, the perpetrators have no reason for believing that they are acting in 
the wrong. On a more relatable level, our own political climate sheds serious doubts on 
the claim that any individual can access the natural law through reason. Take an issue like 
abortion, stem cell research or gay marriage and there will be widespread opposition to 
the “natural law position.” If the law is supposedly common to man, known through 
reason, how can so many people disregard it? And how can rational people disagree on 
these pressing political questions?  
But perhaps overarching in all of these problematic aspects of the natural law is 
the greatest difficulty of them all: the fact that from a political standpoint, the natural law 
seems like a dangerous standard for a lawmaker to follow – especially in America’s 
political backdrop.  In our current political culture, there is a profound hesitancy to make 
political arguments from a natural law base. Secularized to the brink, our political leaders 
are wary of binding themselves to any overt and binding religious connotations. 
Moreover, there is a practical reason why democratic leaders may be hesitant to adhere to 
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any absolutes. The voting public determines what views our elected leaders hold, and 
their fickleness and uncertainty rejects unchanging doctrines like the natural law. An 
electoral body may want conviction, and while politicians should be principled 
individuals who stay true to their own opinions, they do not want to limit their political 
versatility or open themselves to charges of obstinacy.  
 America’s three-branch system lends itself to a special analysis, and it would be 
unwise to paint this critique with a broad brush. From a judicial standpoint, one could 
literally fill libraries documenting various theories of jurisprudence and constitutional 
interpretation, but on the most literal level, judges are supposed to interpret the written 
laws that the legislative branch enacts and the executive branch executes. According to 
Article Three, Section Two of the Constitution, the jurisdiction of the American judiciary 
“shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, [and] the 
Laws of the United States.”13  And since the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure effectively 
eliminate equity courts in America, judges are (or at least should be) limited in their 
interpretation of the law.   
Judges are not supposed to make law, and armed with what one scholar has 
referred to as a potential “hunting license empowering judges to impose their own 
morality to invalidate legislative decisions in genuinely debatable cases,” a natural law 
jurist may be a risk to the constitutional structure of American democracy.14 When they 
apply the written law as passed by elected legislative representatives of the people, judges 
                                                
13 US Constitution, Art. 3, § 2.  
14 Rice, Charles. "Some Reasons for a Restoration of Natural Law Jurisprudence," 24 
Wake Forest Law Review, (1989), 568.  
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ought to restrain themselves from drawing on outside influences.15 For this reason, 
despite a recent history of conservative ideology on the Supreme Court, in addition to a 
high number of Catholic justices (with the appointment of Sonia Sotomayor in 2009, the 
number now stands at six, as she joins Associate Justices Samuel Alito, Anthony 
Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas and Chief Justice John Roberts), not one of 
them has publicly spoken in favor of the natural law as a factor in their jurisprudential 
philosophies.16 
 While the case against judges aligning themselves to the natural law is relatively 
clear, the answers for elected legislators are less obvious. In one understanding, with 
democratic politics so clearly about coalition building, it would seem to make sense for a 
                                                
15 Despite this danger, many see the U.S. constitutional heritage as not threatened by, but 
incorporating and requiring a natural law philosophy. I will discuss the natural law 
heritage of America’s Founders in the following pages, but briefly, many argue that the 
Declaration of Independence, and parts of the Constitution (equal protections clause and 
the doctrine of “substantive due process”) incorporate the natural law. Moreover, as 
Professor Rice suggests, judges would only resort to a natural law jurisprudence  “when 
the conflict between the law or precedent and justice is ‘intolerable’ or ‘unendurable’” (as 
they did, for example, in the German courts, after World War II (Rice, Charles. "Some 
Reasons for a Restoration of Natural Law Jurisprudence," 24 Wake Forest Law Review, 
(1989), 569).  
See Chapter Five of George’s In Defense of Natural Law for a more thorough exploration 
of natural law and contemporary jurisprudence. In it, he explicitly addresses the question 
of whether or not an objective moral law give judges “free wheeling authority” to 
legislate from the bench.  
16 On many occasions, not surprisingly, the precepts of natural law jurisprudence and the 
opinions of some of these justices have overlapped in practice, if not in theory. And 
before his embattled confirmation hearings, Justice Thomas indirectly advocated for the 
natural law. He had endorsed a 1987 article written by Lewis Lehrman's in the American 
Spectator, which argued that because abortion violates the law of God in the right to life 
guaranteed by Declaration of Independence, a decision like Roe must be overturned. 
Thomas allegedly stated that that Lehrman’s argument was a "splendid example of 
applying natural law" (Hearing transcript, September 10, 1991, at 128) . When pressed by 
Senator Joseph Biden, the then-Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, however, 
Thomas, showing required political guardedness, backed away from any association he 
had with natural law philosophy, saying the his endorsement  was merely a “throw-away 
line” (Hearing transcript, September 10, 1991, at 196-197). 
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politician to try to draw connections between his platform and tenets of the natural law, if 
for nothing else than to add those natural law adherents to the ranks of his supporters. On 
the other side of the coin, however, claims to the natural law can be dangerous in popular 
politics. First, voters may recoil at the religious underpinnings of the doctrine. Second, 
framed in the context of contemporary American debates, the natural law is both 
polarizing and at times radical. Such a charge may shock some conservative thinkers, but 
in a society that has widely come to accept premarital sex, for instance, a law (perhaps 
based on the natural law principle that sex should take place for the purposes of 
procreation within the confines of marriage) that bans contraceptives seems antiquated 
and out of touch with society. Moreover, the natural law governs over more than one 
particular policy decision. It is a way of understanding personal morality as well as social 
interaction and political governance. If a politician appeals to the natural law to support 
his stance on abortion, for instance, must he also be bound by it when confronting 
questions on gay marriage? Finally, the natural law does not easily yield to compromises. 
Unchanging truths are not malleable, and as such, are not well-suited for legislative 
committees, campaign trail rhetoric, or even behind-closed-doors executive policy 
meetings. In these ways, the natural law seems foreign to a democratic system of 
governance.   
To elucidate this point, take, for instance, the issue of government activity in 
abortion policy. As William Saletan argues in his book Bearing Right: How 
Conservatives Won the Abortion War, (a title, incidentally, that many conservatives may 
take issue with) the pro-life “natural law” position has one notion of the private life the 
government should protect. Fighting for the fetus’s right to life, this group petitions the 
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government to ban funding of abortions. They believe that the government should not 
force taxpayers to pay for what they deem an immoral abomination that violates the 
natural law. On the left, pro-choice activists who claim they want the government out of a 
woman’s decision-making process fight hard for public funding for abortions. A 
moderate position, one that could perhaps be deemed a more “libertarian” point of view – 
i.e. to withhold public money while also proscribing government bans on abortion – 
emerges as the most coherent middle ground.17 Yet, this position leaves natural law 
theorists feeling utterly defeated (a position that, in fact, closely mirrors our current 
government position on abortion). In majoritarian politics, each side must make 
concessions.  Eternal truth, however, does not.  
The political difficulties are certainly problematic, especially in the American 
constitutional system. They need not, however, frustrate all attempts to revive natural law 
philosophy on both personal and political levels. As we will see, because of certain 
developments in American culture, we may need natural law now more than ever. In such 
a climate, believers in the long history of natural law would do well to recall the great 










                                                
17 Saletan, William. Bearing Right: How Conservatives Won the Abortion War. 





II: The Library or the Kitchen?: The Lives and Influence of Dean Clarence Manion 
and Professor Robert P. George 
 
Throughout the past century, there have been countless conservative intellectuals 
who have also drawn on their Catholic faith when diagnosing and treating the ills of 
American society. From public intellectuals like William F. Buckley and L. Brent Bozell 
to political leaders like John F. Kennedy and Antonin Scalia, a Catholic influence on 
conservative politics is nothing new.  Of course, many liberal intellectuals and politicians 
also identify themselves as Catholic, and for many years, the Democratic Party had a 
strong hold on Catholic voters in America. In the last thirty years, however, for a variety 
of reasons, a shift has occurred in American electoral politics, especially on so-called 
“culture war” issues, and a great number of Catholics find themselves aligning with other 
conservative Christians on the right end of the American political spectrum. Beliefs are 
personal, and political preferences can stand on their own, but it surely helps those right-
leaning Catholics to have a firm intellectual backing to rely upon when defending their 
political stances.  
Working in the tradition of Catholic conservatives are Dean Clarence Manion and 
Professor Robert P. George. Both are leading intellectuals who have played a vital role in 
the development of natural law legal philosophy. One, a now-deceased law professor 
from the Midwestern capital of Catholic higher education, Notre Dame; the other, an 
active and energized philosophical professor of jurisprudence at a secular Ivy League 
school on the East Coast, Princeton. But the influence of these two men was and is not 
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limited to their institutional affiliations. In their respective times, both played an active 
role in the policy-making of conservative politicians, and the writings of both men have 
since had wide-reaching effects among intellectuals all over the country.   
Both men believe in and adhere to the natural law, but their mission is not to 
institute some sort of theocratic government in America. They believe in American 
principles of government, and merely use tenets of the natural law to argue for their 
vision of how the nation can become stronger and more stable. Yet, as we will see, 
although the two men trace their intellectual conclusions to the same roots, these 
conclusions are at times quite distinct, and even in their formulations of the natural law, 
Manion and George are considerably unique.  
Born and raised in Henderson Kentucky, Clarence Emmett “Pat” Manion18 
attended St. Mary’s College in his home state before studying philosophy at Catholic 
University in Washington, D.C. Upon graduation, Manion served as a second lieutenant 
in the Transportation Corps of the United States Army. At the time, he was twenty-one 
years old. After his service, Manion, inspired by his love of legal philosophy, entered into 
Notre Dame Law School where he graduated with a J.D. in 1922. By the age of twenty-
nine (a mere two years after his graduation) Manion was appointed as a law professor at 
Notre Dame. There, he taught constitutional law and was dean of the law school for 
                                                
18 Sources of Manion Bio:  
Hoplin, Nicole and Robinson, Ron. Funding Fathers: The Unsung Heroes of the 
Conservative Movement. (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 2008).  
Kmiec, Douglas W. “The Higher Law Background of the Notre Dame Law School.” 37 
American Journal of Jurisprudence, (1992).  
Manion, Christopher. “Tuned in to Principle.” The American Conservative, Feb. 23, 
(2009).  
Perlstein, Rick. Before the Storm: Barry Goldwater and the Unmaking of the American 
Consensus. (New York, N.Y.: Hill and Wang, 2001).  
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twelve years. As the founder and architect of the Natural Law Institute, he was part of a 
long line of natural law theorists at the school. (That line, incidentally, is still strong 
today, carried on by figures like Charles Rice, Gerard V. Bradley and of course, as we 
will see, a new natural law colleague of Professor George, John Finnis). Manion briefly 
attempted to run for public office, losing a 1932 bid for the nomination for his district’s 
Congressional seat, and a 1934 effort at a Senate nomination. His efforts in public policy 
did not end there though; after retiring from Notre Dame in 1952, he played an 
instrumental role in Senator Robert Taft’s third bid for a presidential nomination. When 
Taft lost the nomination to Eisenhower, and Ike eventually won the presidency, he 
appointed Manion as the chairman of a blue-ribbon commission that reviewed federalism 
implications of administration policies.  
Manion gained national attention with his role in the infamous Bricker 
Amendment, a proposed amendment to the American Constitution that sought to prohibit 
secret “executive contracts” like those Presidents Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman 
entered into with Joseph Stalin. In front of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Manion 
debated Eisenhower’s Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles over the merits of the 
amendment. Manion held that it was necessary to clarify Article Two, Section Two of the 
Constitution, which stipulated that the president “shall have Power, by and with the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties.”19 His advocacy of the amendment, 
however, proved to be the breaking point in Manion’s relationship with Eisenhower, and 
Ike fired him, ending any potential shot Manion had at a Supreme Court appointment. 
                                                
19 U.S. Constitution, Art. 2, § 2. 
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The Bricker Amendment was narrowly voted down in the Senate later that year, but 
Manion was still on the rise.  
Returning to Indiana, for the next twenty-five years, Dean Manion wrote articles 
for the South Bend Tribune and hosted the “Manion Forum,” a nationally-syndicated 
radio show that prided itself on critiquing American politics from a solid foundation of 
conservative principles. On the “Forum,” Manion was regarded as “a powerhouse of 
influence helping bring about renewed loyalty and patriotism in contemporary 
America.”20 He was staunchly conservative and anti-communist; he argued against 
mounting foreign debt, the judicial activism of the Warren Court, deficit spending, and 
government intrusion into areas of private life. He praised America’s religious heritage 
(often referencing with alacrity Justice Brewer’s statement that “[America] is a religious 
nation” from the 1982 Supreme Court case, Church of the Holy Trinity v. United 
States).21 He spoke in favor of ordered liberty, and above all, acclaimed limited 
government. Produced from the library in his home in South Bend, the radio show was a 
huge success that foreshadowed the current popularity of political talk-radio (especially 
that of a conservative strain). Manion never accepted a salary for his broadcasts, despite 
dedicating significant time to thorough and arduous preparation for each show.   In 
addition to this medium, which allowed Manion to reach a wide audience (it aired over 
hundreds of stations nationwide), he also wrote a wildly popular book, The Key to Peace, 
a short but powerful treatise on the virtue of self-government that sold over one million 
copies. Adding to its popularity, the book was distributed to high schools across the 
country by the American Legion.  
                                                
20 Sherwin, Mark. The Extremists. (New York, N.Y.: St. Martin’s Press, 1963), 90. 
21 Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892) 
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But perhaps Manion’s most significant work came in his behind-the-scenes 
orchestration of Arizona senator Barry Goldwater’s book, The Conscience of a 
Conservative. After taping a segment on the “Forum” with Goldwater, Manion convinced 
the senator to write a book in order to communicate Goldwater’s philosophy of limited 
government to the American people. Manion titled the book and persuaded L. Brent 
Bozell (the brother-in-law of National Review founder William F. Buckley, Jr.) to co-
author the book with Goldwater, and when he could not find a publisher, Manion 
launched his own company, the Victor Publishing Company. After footing the bill for the 
printing, Manion disseminated the books in time for the state party conventions of 1960. 
Ultimately, this book helped coalesce a modern conservative movement that reached its 
pinnacle with Ronald Reagan’s presidency in the 1980s. The columnist George Will 
remarked that, while Goldwater “lost forty-four states, [he] won the future.”22 And while 
Goldwater was the face of the new spirit in conservatism, Manion, in Goldwater’s own 
words, “was the Daddy of all of this.”23 
~ 
Robert P. George joined the faculty at Princeton University in the midst of the 
Reagan presidency. The movement that Manion spurred was in full bloom by the time 
George’s career as a scholar began. George graduated from Swarthmore College before 
continuing to Harvard Law School and Oxford University, where he earned his J.D. and 
Ph.D., respectively. He is currently the McCormick Chair in Jurisprudence at Princeton. 
                                                
22 Will, George. “Goldwater: A Man Who Won the Future,” Washington Post, March 27, 
1994.  
23 Hoplin, Nicole and Robinson, Ron. Funding Fathers: The Unsung Heroes of the 
Conservative Movement. (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 2008), 115. 
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In addition to his work in the classroom, George is also the director of the James Madison 
Program in American Ideals and Institutions at Princeton.  
 His accomplishments and accolades are not limited to his work at the university, 
however, as among other things, he was a member of President George W. Bush’s 
Council on Bioethics, a presidential appointee to the United States Commission on Civil 
Rights, and a Judicial Fellow at the Supreme Court of the United States. He also was a 
founder and currently is Chairman of the Board for the National Organization for 
Marriage, and in 2008, received the Presidential Citizens Medal from Former President 
Bush, largely for his work in restricting stem-cell research.   In 2004, he helped a group 
of Christians write a proposed amendment to the Constitution that sought to define 
marriage in exclusively heterosexual terms, and his curriculum vitae is quite extensive, 
adding to his influence in intellectual circles. Some of his more well-known books 
include: Making Men Moral; In Defense of Natural Law; The Clash of Orthodoxies; The 
Meaning of Marriage: Family, State, Market, And Morals; and most recently, Embryo: A 
Defense of Human Life.  
In late 2009, a New York Times Magazine feature on George documented his 
leadership role in the creation of the Manhattan Declaration, a document produced during 
a summit of many of the foremost Christian leaders in America. As the intellectual leader 
of this meeting, George garnered substantial recognition and respect from the meeting’s 
attendees, and has developed this into a de facto role as informal “intellectual point man” 
of the Christian coalition that defends traditional conservative social policies. The Times’ 
article, written by the Washington bureau correspondent and Princeton graduate David D. 
Kirkpatrick, refers to George as the “country’s most influential Christian thinker” who 
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has “parlayed a 13th- century Catholic philosophy into real political influence.”24 
Kirkpatrick lightheartedly continues, citing a conservative Catholic journal, that “if there 
really is a vast right-wing conspiracy, its leaders probably meet in George’s kitchen.”25 
No doubt then, that Professor George has clout – in political, religious, and intellectual 
circles.  
But George’s role as political and intellectual advisor to these Church leaders is 
not new. Over fifteen years ago, George helped Rev. John Meyers, now the archbishop of 
Newark, craft an immensely influential pastoral letter that fueled the debate between pro-
life and pro-choice Catholics. The letter foreshadowed George’s own future writings, 
stating that “natural reason can and should acknowledge the fact that all human persons 
have the right not to be killed unjustly” and that “opposition to abortion is not a sectarian 
position.”26 From then on, religious leaders, and subsequently even political leaders, have 
turned to George as the source for the intellectual support system for their positions.  
 George’s philosophical beliefs rest upon the fact that natural law principles are 
tenable through reason alone, and are not peculiar to his own Catholic – or even Christian 
– intellectual background.  In the vein of a Burkean conservative, he is most known for 
his work using this theory fighting against same-sex marriage, pro-choice public policy, 
and stem-cell research. As a matter of clarity, George argues that Church leaders seeking 
a just society – and by extension, any private citizen or public official seeking such a 
society – should focus first and foremost on the “black and white” issues that have a 
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25 Ibid.  
26 Meyers, John. Pastoral letter: “The Obligations of Catholics and the Rights of Unborn 
Children,” issued June 3, 1990.  
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rational answer to them. Issues like this, such as the three mentioned above, George 
believes, have self-evident solutions that are much more discernable than economic or so-
called “social justice” debates over healthcare, minimum wage, or even international 
relations.27 This is not to say that these latter three issues are any less crucial to a just 
society. In George’s view, informed and well-intentioned people can hold divergent 
opinions on these issues, but in the case of the first set, the natural law can and should 
provide clear answers and resolutions. Whether they acknowledge it or not, all humans 
have access to this natural law, and therefore, our heated debates over issues like 
abortion, marriage, and stem-cell research need not be debates at all. 
 Such are the lives and basic theories of Manion and George. Both men are deeply 
concerned with American prosperity, and turn to the natural law as a way to safeguard 
American exceptionalism. They have used different means to interpret American politics, 
and stand upon various platforms to exert political influence. Both rely on their Catholic 
faith to form their worldview, but do so in distinct ways. Likewise, each possesses a 
unique outlook on the development of natural law theory and looks to employ this theory 
in different, if not opposing, ways. To explore these differences and their political 
implications more thoroughly, I will now investigate the natural law philosophies of 
Clarence Manion and Robert George.  
 
                                                
27 As a retort to this position, one might point to the now relatively quiescent strand in 
Catholic social thought that views morality as a factor of a capitalist ethic. Such a 
position holds that morality is best preserved by curbing the harmful effects of the drive 
for profit, and not necessarily by focusing on what we now refer to as “social issues.” 
This anti-free market strand of Catholic thought was much more prevalent in the latter 




III: “Give Me Liberty, or Give Me Death!”28: Clarence Manion’s Natural Law 
 
Clarence Manion’s theory of the natural law has four defining characteristics: an 
explicit connection to the will of God, a reverence for liberty, a skepticism – if not a 
downright rejection – of government intrusiveness, and a presumption of personal moral 
sensibility. Manion did not write anything directly on the natural law. His philosophy on 
the matter, however, is revealed throughout his many books, articles, and radio 
transcripts. Because there is not a comprehensive documentation of his natural law 
philosophy, it is naturally piecemeal and slightly disjointed.  In short, for Manion, the 
natural law is a presumed framework, alive and strong in the United States since the 
founding of the country, in which he sets out the political principles and values that will 
ensure and preserve American excellence.  
 First, Manion’s religious faith is imbued in his theory of the natural law. Although 
he does not use such religious language overtly, Manion’s reliance on Catholic religious 
themes such as man being created in imago Dei (the image of God) and man’s inherent 
free will are central to his understanding of the natural law. He speaks of religion as 
central to America’s success and stability and regards a religious background as 
necessary for true freedom.29  
 Manion relies on the sacredness of the natural law to argue that such a conception 
of the truth is a necessary prerequisite for freedom, and that such a structure of order 
                                                
28 Patrick Henry, Speech. March 23, 1775. 
29 Manion, Clarence. “Religion and American Law” 22 Boston University Law Review 
(1942), 261.  
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must exist for humans to be seen as moral beings.30 Manion echoes the New Testament’s 
claim that “the truth will set you free” when he argues that the natural law, as a code for 
personal conduct, supersedes the positive laws of government and authorizes human 
beings to pursue their fulfillment unrestrained by official intrusiveness.31 The reverence 
he has for liberty grows directly from his belief that man has a God-given natural right 
and a natural duty to act as a free and autonomous individual.  And this spirit of freedom 
that the natural law protects serves America’s (or any) common good by enriching 
diversity, fostering economic creativity and entrepreneurship, and ensuring stable self-
government.  
Manion believes that as free individuals, humans ought to guard the liberty that 
the natural law guarantees them by being vigilant against the ever-increasing force of 
government expansion.  He states that “man is free only when and where he succeeds in 
limiting and controlling the power of his government. He loses his freedom when 
government breaks loose from its limitations.”32 The natural law, like other formal checks 
on government power (like the Bill of Rights, for instance), is a negative proscription on 
government action.  In Manion’s view, “all forms of [the aggrandizement of state 
power]…contradict nature and thus frustrate the end and purpose for which human 
beings are created.”33  
But what of the necessary order and stability of a society that seeks to thrive as a 
world leader, promote the virtue of its citizens, and instantiate a community of justice? 
                                                
30 Manion, Clarence, The Key to Peace. (Chicago, IL: The Heritage Foundation, Inc., 
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31 John 8:32 
32 Manion, Clarence. Let’s Face It! (South Bend, IN: The Manion Forum, 1956), 9.  
33 Manion, Clarence, The Key to Peace. (Chicago, IL: The Heritage Foundation, Inc., 
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Might such a society need government to act with vigor? For Manion, the answers are not 
that difficult. His natural law philosophy, as it is targeted at limiting government power 
and maximizing individual autonomy, relies on an implied sense of moral understanding 
that each human has. If government cannot intrude on the private lives of individuals, 
people must have the ability and rationality to adhere to the higher law on their own 
accord. For Manion, it is simply enough to assume that God has etched the laws of nature 
on the hearts of all mankind. This common-sense morality makes possible the controlled 
normality and orderliness that liberty requires.  
  Manion’s obsession with individual liberty may seem foreign to those familiar 
with current views on natural law philosophy or conservatism more generally. Yet if one 
considers the work of one of the most influential conservatives of all time, Edmund 
Burke, the confusion subsides. Central to Burke’s work was a consideration of the 
circumstances in which men develop and act on their ideas. Such a Burkean consideration 
of circumstances helps clarify why Manion focuses so intently on the natural law as a 
way to preserve individual liberty and curtail state power. Dean Manion was active 
predominately in the middle of the twentieth century, and his worldview was framed by 
the experiences of the World Wars and the rise of communism in the Soviet Union. His 
principle target, then, is authoritarian restrictions on freedom. Manion’s political views 
are characterized by a reverence for freedom and self-government, or as he refers to 
them, “the American principles.” He constantly praises the Founders and looks to their 
Enlightenment background and understanding of rights – a practice that may seem 
foreign to conservatives today. This appears to be at odds with a modern natural law 
framework, but Manion’s theory of natural law leaves little room for an active 
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government. He identifies the natural law with the founding of the country, thereby 
creating the link between an appreciation for freedom, limited government, and the 
natural law and natural rights.  
Manion, typical of many constitutional originalists today, looks to the Founding 
Fathers to identify the true principles of American government. His theory holds that the 
Founders, themselves working against an oppressive government, relied upon the higher 
law of God to justify the American Revolution. Seeking to identify the natural law strand 
in the beliefs of the American Forefathers, Manion turns to the common law background 
that many of them held. Citing English common law experts like Henry of Bracton, John 
Fortescue, and Edward Coke, Manion argues that the natural law heritage of America 
was, can, and should be the last best hope against oppressive statism, whether that 
materializes in the form of despotism, fascism, socialism, or democratic tyranny. Manion 
argues that the founders of America relied upon their common law heritage to understand 
the natural law. To illustrate, he refers to perhaps the most definitive source for common 
law, William Blackstone’s Commentaries, which contains the following passage:  
“When the Supreme Being formed the universe and created matter out of nothing, 
he impressed certain principles upon that matter from which it can never depart 
and without which it would cease to be… Man considered as a creature must 
necessarily be subject to the laws of his Creator… It is necessary that he should in 
all points conform to his Maker’s will…The will of his Maker is called the law of 
Nature… This law of Nature being coeval with mankind and dictated by God 
Himself, is superior in obligation to any other; no human laws are of any validity 
if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid derive all their force and all of 
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their authority from this origin…Hence it follows that the first and primary end of 
human laws is to maintain these absolute [God-given] rights of individuals.”34 
It was clear to Manion, as well as to the founders of American democracy, that the 
natural law was fundamental to the English tradition of common law.  
 The American founders were well-versed in this common law tradition, and their 
reliance on the natural law stands in stark contrast to the British Government insisting 
that “the law of the land” and the “immemorial rights of English subjects” were 
“exclusively and precisely what the British Parliament declared them to be.”35 
Parliamentary absolutism is dangerously threatening to natural law precepts. This, 
according to Manion, more so than taxation, representation, or America’s very 
independence as its own sovereign nation, was the real issue in the American Revolution. 
He argues that, had the colonists simply abandoned “their ingrained concepts of the 
natural law, [they] undoubtedly could have made a comfortable settlement of their tax 
and navigation difficulties with England.”36 The colonists were ultimately more wary of 
the future arbitrary power of an unchecked Parliament and therefore demanded their 
independence and an adherence to a higher, natural law.  
 It is for this reason that Manion identifies the Declaration of Independence as the 
crucial document in the American Founding and the true source of the natural law 
heritage of America. Manion argues that the Declaration is “the best possible 
condensation of the natural law-common law doctrines as they were developed and 
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expounded in England and America.”37 The Declaration unites independence with the 
natural law, giving both added force and securing both as sources for the future freedom 
and stability of the country.  
 This view of the Declaration as essentially a document preserving liberty and 
order is nothing extravagant or novel, but merely the affirmation of commonly held 
American beliefs – or so argues Manion, relying heavily on the writing of Thomas 
Jefferson and John Adams.  Adams wrote to Timothy Pickering in 1822 that, “there is not 
an idea in [the Declaration] but what had been hackneyed in Congress for two years 
before.” And in a letter to Madison from the subsequent year, Jefferson wrote that the 
Declaration “contained no new ideas” and that he “did not consider it as any part of [his] 
charge to invent new ideas altogether, and to offer no sentiment which had never been 
expressed before.” In short, as Jefferson wrote to Henry Lee, Jr., the natural law 
principles in the Declaration were merely “an expression of the American mind.”38 
 This American mind, according to Manion, has not changed in the two hundred 
plus years since America’s founding. What distinguishes the United States and what 
gives it greatness for Dean Manion is what Alexis de Tocqueville observed as the 
ubiquitous American “love of freedom.” Threats to this freedom come in all different 
forms, yet hostile or benign, they endanger that spirit of freedom that makes America 
great.  
 This is the reason why Manion’s fear of authoritarianism in all its forms is so 
poignantly connected to the natural law. A natural law that complements the 
constitutional checks and balances of America’s system of government and preserves 
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individual liberty is the highest form of protection for American values. Writing in the 
wake of World War II and at the height of the Cold War, Manion observed the threats of 
both fascism and communism as all too real, but also as the same threats that America’s 
founders stood up to during the Revolution.  
 
IV: Preserving Our Moral Ecology: The Practical Implications of Robert George’s 
Natural Law 
 
Just as the horrors of fascism and the threat of communism help one to understand 
Manion’s formulation of the natural law, the current state of American culture elucidates 
George’s natural law framework.  Manion wrote before what Professor Robert Faulkner 
refers to as the “liberationism” of the 1960s. He wrote before the Supreme Court decided 
Roe v. Wade in 1973, and before the complete secularization of public schools.  He wrote 
before the advent of a vulgarized mass media and a culture that is seemingly obsessed 
with sex and violence. He wrote before there was a demand for same-sex marriage, 
before the destruction of the family, and before embryonic stem-cell research. George, 
quite simply, did not.  
George, although about as traditionally conservative as they come, is not a 
populist polemic in the same sense as a figure like Robert Bork, for instance.  Reading 
George, one will not find a scathing condemnation of the lyrics of the latest rap artist, a 
denunciation of the current subject matter of prime-time television, or a complaint about 
the number of out-of-wedlock births throughout the country. However, these are cultural 
realities that even the most progressive among us would acknowledge. The meritorious or 
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deleterious effects of these facets of our culture, I suppose, are up for debate. For many, 
though, they are both a signal for and a product of a wider disregard for virtue in our 
society that is also reflected in more substantial areas of public life such as abortion 
policy and a culture that is obsessed with violence and sexual promiscuity.  
Some intellectual culture warriors that seek to revive our society from a continual 
devolution and lay the groundwork for long-term American prosperity argue that we must 
adhere to the teachings of the natural law to stop what they perceive as dangerous moral 
erosion. Daniel Patrick Moynihan wrote an article in 1993 entitled “Defining Deviancy 
Down” in which he argued that our standards for virtuous behavior are constantly being 
lowered in order to normalize would-be deviant behavior. By no means was he 
advocating such a process; he was merely observing the culture and social values he saw 
around him. It is argued that to put a stop to this downward movement, as individuals and 
as a country – and to “make men moral” –  we must attune ourselves to some set of 
objective standards of ethics that refuse to bend to the winds of present social “values.”    
 Critics of contemporary American culture argue that, as a product of post-
Enlightenment relativism, American society has lost any objective standard for virtuous 
behavior – both for individuals and for policymakers. With the values of individualism 
and subjectivity taken to the extreme, they claim that there is no place for objective 
standards that make men moral. The individualist strand in our culture makes man an 
island, participating in social community only to avoid the “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, 
and short” life man experiences in the state of nature.39 He has no relation to others and 
subsequently no duty to improve himself within the confines of conventional (or 
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objective) moral improvement. The relativist strand, they claim, then rejects the assertion 
that any one road to total human perfection (including moral perfection) is more correct 
than any other route. With these ideals prized above all others, it is argued that our 
culture has completely lost appreciation for virtue or “the good.” For many individuals 
looking to halt this process, natural law theory provides a rational standard that upholds 
these values and has the potential to guide individual conduct and social policy. 
George, I think, is alarmed by and opposed to the moral devolution in our culture, 
but his work is not geared toward a mainstream audience. (Unlike Manion’s The Key to 
Peace, which was a New York Times bestseller, George’s work is often directed at a more 
academic audience, although he has written pieces in mainstream periodicals from time 
to time). George’s task is to provide a rational, intellectual basis for the traditional 
(Catholic) conservative social policy positions. At times, his writing is cerebral to the 
point of being esoteric, and, for those of us laymen unpacking his arguments, I think his 
substance sometimes gets lost in translation.  
 Having said that, there are few things more satisfying than tracking George’s 
adroit arguments and reaching his conclusions with him. The process of accompanying 
George on a journey from premises through argumentation to conclusions is like reaching 
an epiphany. And George could not be more well-intentioned in his complexity. His goal 
is to make men moral and to order political life in such a way as to protect the 
fundamental nature of human life. He draws an analogy to describe the task his work is 
assuming:  
“A physical environment marred by pollution jeopardizes people’s physical 
health; a social environment abounding in vice threatens their moral well-being 
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and integrity. A social environment in which vice abounds…tends to damage 
people’s moral understandings and weaken their characters as it bombards them 
with temptations to immorality.”40  
The task at hand, then, is to campaign to improve the social environment and enhance the 
virtue of the souls of individuals. George sees government policy as one way (among 
many) to improve the “moral ecology” of American society, thereby avoiding the 
propensity for vice and building an ethic of virtue.  
In our current political discourse, there is a conspicuous absence of a discussion 
of virtue or “the good” as the proper teleological purpose of political life. Gone are the 
musings of Aristotle that a government, although instituted for the preservation of life, 
exists for the attainment of “the good life.”41 Throughout his Politics, Aristotle refers to 
the purpose of political life as directing the citizenry toward a good and virtuous life.42 In 
modern America, by contrast, no one virtue is heralded over any other and rare is the 
occasion when there is any sort of public acknowledgment of the attempt to inculcate 
virtue publicly.   Into this setting, George enters and argues for the best way to “make 
men moral.”   
George believes that in order to put a stop to the devolution of decency, we can 
turn to the concept of public morality. His argument, in short, is that because “private acts 
of private parties…can and do have public consequences,” it is necessary to regulate 
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them using public measures.43 To help his audience understand this position, he reiterates 
his analogy of public morals legislation and laws protecting public health and safety. A 
company that produces carcinogenic smoke from one of its factories harms inhabitants of 
the area around the factory and the wider physical ecology. Such a company, even if 
criminal laws did not exist, would still have moral obligations to reduce the harmful 
effects of its factory. But the coercive effects of public law, justified by the public 
externalities of the carcinogenic smoke, add a further dimension that supports this sense 
of obligation. The logic is the same for morals legislation.  
 Take, for example, the issue of sexually explicit material. As George argues, by 
“arousing carnal desire unintegrated with the procreative and unitive goods of marriage 
[such material] damages a community’s moral ecology.”44  The central harm of these 
products is a moral harm, as it “erodes important shared public understandings 
of…morality on which the health of the institutions of marriage and family in any culture 
vitally depend.” 45 And this in turn leads to countless other negative public side effects. 
So in addition to the personal moral obligation we have individually to eschew such 
material, and in addition to the role of families, churches, and other secondary 
associations that foster moral development, the law functions as a support system that 
backs those primary sources of morality.  
 To protect the social goods of stable marriages and stable families (and the social 
benefits that come from these goods), public morals legislation can buttress individual 
moral decision-making. Without such support, the social opinions of ideals like chastity 
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and fidelity are undercut by personal immoralities to the point that they “deprive family 
life [of] its full sense and viability.”46 One can argue that contemporary toleration of (if 
not praise for) sexual liberation has wiped out widespread respect for virtues like chastity, 
or even fidelity, in favor of promiscuity and hedonistic pleasure seeking. This, the 
argument goes, undercuts the family and leads to dire social consequences like single-
parent families, higher crime rates, and economic hardship. These public effects are 
simply too great to write off as unrelated to personal vice, and George’s solution is to 
turn to public morals legislation.   
It is in this respect that Dean Manion and Professor George differ most 
profoundly. For Manion, although he may be fully in support of George’s goals, he 
cannot agree in practice. Noble ends simply do not justify means that include expansive 
government in any form. The reverence he has for individual freedom trumps George’s 
call for public morality, and renders the individual inviolate in the face of government 
power.  
Yet George does not want to paternalistically impose morality of any sort. His 
argument is that publicly acknowledged morality comes from individuals and is enacted 
to protect individuals. Even if George is wrong about certain issues of morality and his 
positions are generated out of an unknown and unintended bigotry (as some might view 
his views on homosexual marriage, for instance), his focus on the primary role of private 
parties and groups overrides any arguments against public morality.47 It is these entities – 
individuals and groups of individuals – that determine a community’s moral values, 
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inculcate them through families, religious organizations, or free associations, and 
ultimately have the power to codify them into laws that carry the force and authority to 
help support the “primary” sources through participation in the democratic process. In 
this respect, the substance of the morals legislation is not the focus for George. Although 
he would argue that his formulation of the new natural law ought to serve as the basis for 
public morality, he principally advocates for public morals legislation broadly 
understood, as a way to preserve and maintain the public moral ecology that a particular 
political community chooses.  And even within a new natural law framework like George 
proposes, there is room for the American value of diversity. The new natural law is based 
on a “diversity of human goods” and a desire for integral human fulfillment, and these 
diverse features help guard against paternalistic government.48 
But even with these protections, in a country as big as the United States, the moral 
values of various communities vary widely and there is no agreement on identifying the 
new natural law as the rightful source of moral authority. Ours is a country that lauds 
concepts like cultural diversity, and such values naturally entail wide-ranging and 
incongruous understandings of morality. Moreover, most Americans are rightfully 
cautious of – if not categorically opposed to – public morals legislation.49 And as our 
constitutional system sets up a government of delegated and enumerated powers, it is 
unknown whether the United States has the political will or the constitutional legitimacy 
to enact such laws of community morality.  
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I will address the objection relating to the lack of political will in the conclusion 
of the paper, but I will now turn to the constitutional feasibility of public morality. As 
George notes, the American constitutional system is a combination of state/local 
authority and the federal government. While the former types are deemed governments of 
“general jurisdiction” with police powers that grant local legislators broad power to act 
for the common good, the latter level is prima facie one of delegated and enumerated 
powers. Highlighting this difference in Federalist No. 45, James Madison wrote: 
“The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government 
are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are 
numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on external 
objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; with which last the 
power of taxation will, for the most part, be connected. The powers reserved to 
the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of 
affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal 
order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.”50 
And in 1819, Supreme Court Chief Justice Marshall wrote that, “[The federal] 
government is acknowledged by all, to be one of enumerated powers.”51 In such a system 
of “enumerated powers” that are “few and defined” and were designed to be “exercised 
principally on external objects,” how can George justifiably argue for public morals 
legislation on the national level? If the Constitution is to be more than just a ship, are we 
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not required to call upon the national government to act only where it has constitutionally 
delegated powers? 
George does not think so. He states that “for all practical purposes, the [federal] 
government of the United States functions as a government of general jurisdiction.”52 The 
Madisonian framework is simply no longer an accurate portrayal of the American 
political system. If the national government and its agencies can regulate the slope of a 
wheelchair ramp, mandate national public school standards, or overhaul the entire 
healthcare system, it surely has the authority beyond its originally enumerated powers.  
George gives several examples of ways in which the national government can 
circumnavigate Madison’s original understanding, including the “Necessary and Proper 
Clause,” the doctrine of implied powers, and the federal judiciary.53 In addition, he cites 
examples of this process in action, such as occupational safety and health regulations and 
the protection of the physical environment. Concerns for public morality, according to 
George, are just as important as these; therefore, advocates for public morals legislation 
would do well to mimic these successful precedents.  
For George, public morality is a public good. It promotes socially valuable 
byproducts like stable families, reliable role models, precipitous reductions in crime, and, 
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in general, a culture that encourages virtue and a respect for human dignity. Because the 
personal actions of individuals can and do have public consequences, public morals 
legislation can justifiably regulate “private conduct insofar as it harms, or threatens to 
harm, the public interest.”54 Individuals cannot have a moral right to do wrong. To invoke 
privacy as a basis for such a right is erroneous and harmful, as the public dimensions of 
private actions are evident. Although George is chided by colleagues like Joseph Boyle 
for having “incorrigibly authoritarian impulses,” his efforts to restore public morality and 
to make men moral are laudable, insofar as they attempt to improve American political 
and social life.55  
 But George is also careful to point out that his position is not one of novelty. In 
addition to showing the constitutional legitimacy of a system of public morality, he 
demonstrates how such a concept has roots as old as democratic government itself. Just 
as Manion relies upon the natural law tradition of the American Founders, George calls 
upon the Greek philosopher Aristotle to argue why a government should be concerned 
with making men moral. In the words of Aristotle:  
“Any polis which is truly so called, and is not merely one in name, must devote 
itself to the end of encouraging goodness. Otherwise a political association sinks 
into a mere alliance, which only differs in space from other forms of alliance 
where the members’ life [are] at a distance from one another…What constitutes a 
polis is an association of households and clans in a good life, for the sake of 
attaining a perfect and self-sufficing existence…It is therefore for the sake of 
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good actions, and not for the sake of social life, that political associations must be 
considered to exist.”56  
In short, social interaction and government policy can improve the moral fiber of men, 
and in a political community that seeks to improve the individual lives of its members 
and the collective well-being of the group, such an effort to preserve the moral ecology is 
needed.  
There are four main points that George makes in favor of public morals 
legislation. First, public morality helps prevent the self-corruption that results from 
immoral indulgence. Although it is often argued that government is not instituted to 
protect man from himself, this role can have positive personal effects.57 Secondly, by 
stigmatizing, if not erasing the bad examples immoral actions provide for others, public 
morals legislation mitigates the spread of vice. Thirdly, as a secondary source to families, 
churches, etc, public morality helps educate people on moral right and wrong. It is crucial 
to remember that, in this role, public morality is clearly a secondary source and derives 
its power and legitimacy from the political communities that enact it. Finally, and most 
importantly, public morals legislation preserves the moral ecology that frames our 
individual moral choices.58  
In the face of these positive effects of public morality, George admits to several 
difficulties with the task of Making Men Moral at the outset of the book. The principal 
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and most blatant objection is that laws, however in tune with the precepts of the natural 
law as they may be, simply cannot make men moral. Such a role for government is 
outside of its scope and beyond its capability. Dean Manion might be pleased with such a 
statement. The process of legislating morality does little to change the inner character of 
man’s disposition. That job is best left to families, churches, faith groups, schools, civil 
associations, and the like.  
Secondly, even if a political leader thinks that an action is morally wrong, he must 
consider the “complex circumstances of particular political communities at particular 
times.”59 Teetering on the edge of moral relativism, it would seem that such principle 
would lead to different moral objectives in different settings, based on practical 
circumstances. But this may be valid. A political community that is threatened by 
instability would do well to protect its citizens’ physical well-being and property and 
ensure its own solvency before turning to the task of moral construction. To a degree, we 
see this in American politics as well. Only when the economy is growing and our foreign 
relations are stable do mainstream American voters willingly discuss moral – or “culture 
war” – issues.     
The third main objection facing George is that some oppose the standard by 
which he judges morality and the morals legislation that would follow. Although 
adherents call the natural law universal and reason-based, I have already outlined how 
some object to its narrow and countercultural teachings.60 If the natural law is so clear-cut 
and obvious to rational beings, why is there so much disagreement on what is right and 
wrong? If we have black and white answers, why are there even debates over same-sex 
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marriage, abortion, euthanasia or stem-cell research? On this front, George himself 
admits he is open to criticism. But as (he and) I suppose, if one is to be criticized for 
anything, having too much faith in human reason might be the best option.  
And to his harsh critics – especially those relativists who claim that there are no 
absolutes – George can also turn to the argument that such a relativistic claim that moral 
laws are unjust is itself a moral assertion that supposes a definite “right” answer. Laws 
cannot make men moral. In a liberal democracy, the state has a limited role in governing 
the people. But this does not mean we must give up the fight.  
To return to what I called the principal and most blatant objection to George’s 
thesis – and to see how he addresses it – let us consider the charge that moral coercion by 
the state does not make men moral. An individual’s action is only moral (or immoral) 
when, to borrow Immanuel Kant’s terminology, the maxim upon which it was decided is 
chosen for internal right (or wrong) reasons. In other words, one should follow a moral 
course of action because it is the right thing to do, not to seek reward or avoid 
punishment – intentions that Kant calls “heteronomous” motives.  
 Government enacted (or so-called “positive”) laws based on moral principle, such 
as those advanced by the natural law then, seem to miss the point. If one can only choose 
morality based on an internalized thought process, the rewards, or more likely 
punishments, that are tied to government laws do not actually make men moral. In fact, 
they may pose a hurdle to true moral discernment. If a young woman elects to forgo 
having an abortion and instead carries out her pregnancy and puts her child up for 
adoption out of fear of being prosecuted under a hypothetical anti-abortion law, that 
could have adverse effects on a society’s mores. In an ideal world, it would be morally 
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advantageous – for the young woman and for the wider society – to go through a careful 
and conscientious discernment process where she comes to respect the value of her 
fetus’s (potential) life and makes the choice on personal moral grounds.  
Now, this can be debated ad nauseum, because in the present case, of course, if a 
legislative body truly respects the potential life of a fetus, saving this will be the 
immediate priority, and the maxim upon which the decision to do so is based becomes 
merely a secondary concern. In such an instance, the ends may justify the means. But 
there are potentially less controversial reasons to support laws aimed at improving a 
society’s morals as well. Again, turning to Aristotle, one finds that his point, as George 
explains,  
“is not that moral good is realized whenever the law produces in people outward 
behavior that conforms with what morality requires, even if that behavior is 
purely the product of fear of punishment. Rather, [Aristotle’s] point is that, given 
the natural tendency of the majority of people to act on passionate motives in 
preference to reason (i.e. love of the good), the law must first settle people down 
if it is to help them to gain some appreciation of the good, some grasp of the 
intrinsic value of morally upright choosing, some control by their reason of their 
passions.”61  
In other words, as a subsidiary (a word that George reminds his readers has Latin roots 
connoting both a supplementary and “helpful” role) reinforcement mechanism that 
pushes a person to follow his reason over his passion, or as an example-providing a 
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roadmap that directs man to the good, the moral law can help habituate a person to pursue 
the good, eventually for its own sake.  
It should be added here that an appeal to the ubiquity of vice in our culture, or 
even to the well-informed interlocutors who debate and disagree over issues like the right 
to an abortion or the right to view sexually explicit material does not serve as a valid 
piece of evidence for the position that the natural law – new or old – cannot possibly be 
universal and accessible to rational humans. Like coming to understand one’s belief in 
God or a higher order to the universe, the definition of happiness, or the very purpose of 
life, an appreciation for the natural law is one of the higher things in life that does not 
come to the intellectually lazy.  
  Answers to these higher questions, including clarity on the natural law, comes 
only those who are willing to devote themselves to the time and effort required. I write 
this not as someone who claims to have any of these answers myself, but as someone 
who, after eight years of Jesuit education, has come to appreciate the value of an 
intellectual and spiritual journey for truth. The natural law is reason-based and accessible 
to any human being. The prevalence of violations of the natural law then may not be 
signs of its falsity, but rather, a lack of understanding of its precepts. 
Having a society that encourages such a journey and promotes introspection of the 
higher things is one of the upshots of developing a community’s moral ecology.   
Because, whether intended or not, “private immoralities have public consequences,” and 
because the current state of our moral ecology is one of endangerment, public officials 
have to take steps to inculcate a public morality and to endorse the development of a 
Cassidy 46 
personal sense of ethics.62  As Aristotle reminds us, what makes a political community 
more than a mere conglomeration of atomistic individuals is its effort to encourage the 
goodness or flourishing (eudaimonia) of its citizen members.  
One may inquire about the connection between George’s advocacy for morals 
legislation and his natural law philosophy. In short, as a rational precept accessible by all 
(through careful and conscientious development), the natural law can function as a 
common ground for political deliberation on questions of public morality. Now, as one 
may deduce, even though the natural law is based on reason, well-intentioned individuals 
may differ on its particular applications. In individual ethical reflection, these differences 
are less problematic, because as a moral decision-maker, a specific moral agent warrants 
the praise or blame for his action. When we extrapolate this to the level of policy-making 
however, these ethical or moral deliberations have much further-reaching effects. What 
then is the best way to apply the natural law in these instances? 
For George, the natural law in the public sphere is a foundation for policy debate. 
If rational agents accept its basic precepts, the natural law can thus rule out certain 
irrational policies, like for instance, euthanizing comatose individuals. To illustrate this 
example, if we accept the dignity that comes from our condition as human beings, we can 
conclude that human life in all forms is inviolate. Moreover, as humans, we are always 
fulfilling certain potentialities that are unknown to us. As entities capable of causing 
instances we were not caused to cause, we have the unique ability to enact a wide range 
of possible outcomes.  Our futures to us are neither known nor finalized. We must be 
open to unknown possibilities. Similarly, individuals in a comatose state have futures 
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unknown to us (or them). Medical miracles can and do occur, as when individuals emerge 
from severe comas and can recount experiences of being “trapped” in their bodies yet 
able to experience their surroundings.  By giving us the reasons of dignity (in this sense, 
we need to increase our reverence for human life) and of the unknown nature of human 
potential (in this sense, we need a certain humility in the face of life’s great mysteries), 
the natural law helps frame a debate such as the ethical permissibility of euthanasia in a 
rational and defined way.63 
This debate and deliberation, among equal rational human beings, is then most 
fairly enacted through the democratic process. Man’s rationality and freedom confers 
upon him awesome and God-like capabilities of deliberation, judgment, and choice.64 In 
addition to being the foundation for our equal human dignity, these traits allow for us to 
reflect in community on how best to protect virtue in the public sector. Having accepted 
the precepts of the natural law, our deliberation is rational, framed, and democratically 
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V: Intellectual Backing to George’s Conceptions of Natural Law and Public 
Morality 
 
In his advocacy for public morals legislation, George makes clear his desire to 
identify both a historical precedent (in both the works of classical antiquity and in the 
United States) and a philosophical or intellectual foundation for his positions. The way he 
connects his two main ideas (viz. the concept of public morality and his theory of the new 
natural law) through the democratic process and the individual dignity of rational human 
beings suggests an even deeper framework of personal ethics and public morality. The 
intricacies of this new natural law framework are the subject of this section.  
In many respects, Manion’s natural law theory would seem to be more practical 
than George’s. For George, his natural law philosophy is the product of intense 
intellectual development, and this stands in sharp contrast to a natural law for Manion 
that is simply “natural.” (Manion tosses this term around without much explanation, truly 
relying on what he calls the “self-evidence” of the practical ramifications of his natural 
law philosophy). Perhaps aware of the vulnerability of such a position, new natural law 
theorists like George have a much broader and deeper philosophical framework behind 
them. Drawing on the work of Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle, and John Finnis, et. al., 
these new natural lawyers are men of evident intellectual prowess. I will use the work of 
these three thinkers with a study of George to explore the unique and complex tenets of 
new natural law. George, ever the conservative Thomist, quips several times with self-
deprecation that in reality, his work is nothing novel in comparison to the new natural 
lawyers that preceded him.  
Cassidy 49 
 The new natural law theory is based on the assertion that our practical reason can 
determine “basic goods” of human life that, as Christopher Tollefsen states, are 
“constitutive aspects of genuine human flourishing.”65 John Finnis categorizes the basic 
goods as life (including considerations of health), knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, 
sociability, practical reasonableness, and religion.66 Of these basic human goods, no one 
is superior or inferior to another. In natural law parlance, the basic goods are ordered in 
no hierarchy, are incommensurable with one another, and can and ought to exist together. 
The goods, as “fundamental” or “basic,” are unique and beneficial in themselves, and not 
means to some other end.  
It is these goods that give “basic reasons for action [and] are fundamental aspects 
of human well-being and fulfillment.”67 These goods apply to all human beings, and do 
so equally. Therefore, it is possible to walk a mile in your neighbor’s shoes, as an 
understanding of these basic goods can and should motivate our actions towards others as 
well as ourselves.  
As George and his colleagues are principally concerned with stressing a natural 
law philosophy that is based solely in reason, we should explore how our practical reason 
grasps these basic goods. It is not through “antecedent knowledge of human nature” nor 
through inferential insights into human disposition.68 Our knowledge of basic goods, 
instead, comes from the non-inferential efforts we make to realize human fulfillment, or 
the human telos, understood through various non-theoretical insights like “empirical 
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possibilities and environmental constraints.”69 This non-inferential aspect of the new 
natural law is best explained by contrasting it with a theory of normative nature, one that 
so-called neo-scholastic thinkers identify with the natural law philosophy of Thomas 
Aquinas.  
This conventional natural law understanding posits that the standard for judging 
morality is whether an act conforms to (human) nature. With a supposed understanding of 
human nature (and natural human ends), our practical intellect takes over and guides us 
with the direction that “good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided,” 
Aquinas’s first principle of practical reason.70 “Good” in this neo-scholastic 
understanding refers to “those actions that conform to properly human ends” while “evil” 
refers to the actions that fail in this respect.71 Our practical intellect, in this neo-scholastic 
view, therefore guides our moral reasoning, but does so only with a presupposed moral 
understanding, viz. a prior knowledge of the objectivity of what is morally respectable 
and what is not. This presupposition relies upon human intellect operating in its 
speculative mode, that is, basing practical judgments on the morality of a certain action 
on metaphysical, ontological, or theoretical inquires.72 As soon as we question the 
normativity of nature, however, this neo-scholastic interpretation of Aquinas runs into 
difficulties.73 For this reason, the new natural law thinkers argue that Aquinas’s true 
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position does not rely on a normative understanding of human nature, but identifies the 
natural law through the intelligibility and rationality of human actions.74  
First developed in a 1965 article by Germain Grisez in Natural Law Forum, this 
understanding of the natural law defines the “good” in Aquinas’s formulation of the first 
principle of practical reason not as morally upright actions, but any actions that are 
intelligible and rationally appreciated as worthwhile.75 “Evil” actions are those that are 
not aimed at intelligible ends and therefore not rationally worthwhile. In short, if an 
action is aimed at the realization of one of the intrinsic goods of human nature, it is good.  
As George notes, this understanding of the natural law “neither presupposes a knowledge 
of right and wrong nor, a fortiori, enjoins us to choose the morally upright course of 
action.”76 Viewed in such a light, Aquinas’s first principle of practical reason merely 
guides our rational thinking and ensures that our “good” actions have rational and 
intelligible ends. Oddly, choices that are immoral yet are rationally aimed at a human end 
(e.g. to use one of George’s illustrations, a doctor who kidnaps a child to conduct life-
threatening experimentation in an attempt to cure a disease) meet the conditions of the 
                                                                                                                                            
figures like Hitler or Stalin, or even natural disasters that devastate countless innocent 
people each year. The difficulties that accompany these questions of theodicy are all 
implicit in the new natural law’s effort to distance itself from a view of nature as 
normative.  
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first principle. Only with further formulations of “modes of responsibility” and the 
subsequent derivation of moral norms do specific moral proscriptions emerge. 
Knowledge of the intrinsic ends of human nature requires no speculative inquiries 
into metaphysics or even anthropology. Instead, mere practical intellect grasps certain 
ends as reasons intrinsic in themselves, requiring no further explanation, i.e. Finnis’s 
seven basic goods. (To review, these are: life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, 
sociability, practical reasonableness, and religion.) As ends in themselves, these goods 
not only have an inherent worth that Aquinas sees as per se nota (self-evident) but also 
are the constitutive aspects of human fulfillment or flourishing. But here is a crucial 
point: knowledge of these essential goods, while indeed the basic groundwork for the 
natural law, is not a firm criterion for resolving moral questions – for an individual or for 
social policy. Instead, it is “our intelligent grasp of human goods [that] makes moral 
questions possible.”77  
To return to the example of the well-intentioned doctor who kidnaps a child for 
experimentation, consider the intelligible ends he has in mind. In going through with the 
experimentation, the doctor is pursuing the goods of knowledge (scientific knowledge 
that will ostensibly lead to medical breakthroughs) and life and health (of those the 
breakthroughs will cure). If the doctor chooses not to experiment on the child, he will be 
pursuing the goods of the life and health of the child, and therefore that decision is also 
intelligible. In his effort to explain the intelligible ends of human actions, Aquinas 
(through the interpretation of natural law thinkers) opens a world of moral questioning to 
us (both courses of action for the doctor can be seen as intelligible) but does not define a 
                                                
77 Ibid., 1380. 
Cassidy 53 
moral norm by which we ought to guide our choices.  The new natural lawyers realize 
this though, and attempt to derive moral norms to form our understanding of the basic 
goods.  
With knowledge of the basic human goods, we then turn to how they can and 
ought to affect our moral reasoning and potentially our political policymaking. As they 
stand now, the intrinsic goods exclude only “pointless” activity and give us no reason for 
choosing one intelligible good over another. To provide an alternative example to our 
doctor, we could intelligibly choose both to play Russian roulette (pursuing the good of 
“play”) and not to play (pursuing the good of “life”).78 If no hierarchy exists among 
goods, what, if any, principles exist to help us distinguish certain intelligible courses of 
action as more choice-worthy than others?  As a theory of moral order, the natural law 
(new or old) must be pertinent to such moral reasoning. The moral applicability of the 
basic human goods occurs when practical reasoning, which has provided us with the 
recognition of and direction towards the self-evident goods, is applied to specific 
circumstances in which we can choose which goods to enact.  
This practical reasoning imparts a set of general moral principles that structure 
and guide moral questioning. These moral principles, in the work of Finnis, Grisez, et. 
al., have been referred to as “modes of responsibility.”79 There are a number of “modes” 
and their derivation helps rational moral actors in applying the natural law in specific 
moral conundrums and in choosing between or among competing rational courses of 
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action. Foremost among these modes is what new natural law thinkers refer to as the first 
principle of morality: 
“In voluntarily acting for human goods and avoiding what is opposed to them, one 
ought to choose and otherwise will those and only those possibilities whose 
willing is compatible with a will toward integral human fulfillment.” 80  
George classifies other modes, such as one that forbids directly acting against a 
basic human good (i.e. “doing evil that good might come of it”) as “specifications of this 
first principle.”81 Therefore, for instance, in pursuing the good of “life,” moral agents 
would be barred from obvious injustices like murder, but would interpret the debates on 
euthanasia, abortion, and capital punishment in a much different light.82 Natural law 
theorists like Christopher Tollefsen argue that contraception and other forms of non-
procreative sexual intercourse also are “opposed” to life, and therefore, should be 
avoided.83  A couple knows the possibility of the creation of a new life, but wishing not 
to create this, they contracept the baby, but in doing so, oppose one of the basic human 
goods. Similarly, with respect to the good of “sociability,” we have a duty to participate 
in community with others, cultivate friendships and public interactions. As a social being, 
a human can only approach integral human fulfillment in community with others. Thus, 
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actions against sociability like lies and acts of deliberate deceit thwart the social good in 
man, and therefore should be avoided.  
The modes also “exclude as practically unreasonable (i.e. immoral) various types 
of willing inconsistent with a will that is well-disposed toward all of the human goods.”84 
In other words, the modes enjoin that even intelligible actions must be aimed at integral, 
holistic, and complete human fulfillment. Therefore, our doctor cannot sacrifice the life 
of a child to gain knowledge and we could not “play” Russian roulette to the detriment of 
our life. Nota bene, however, that even actions aimed at integral fulfillment will 
inevitably fall short. As George states: 
“No choice, or set of humanly possible choices, can bring about overall 
fulfillment. In none can one realize every humanly fulfilling possibility. The very 
open-endedness of the basic goods precludes this. The possibilities realized in and 
by human choices and actions are aspects, but only aspects, of complete human 
well-being…The principle of integral human fulfillment is an ideal: not in the 
sense of a Platonic form of the good existing in a realm transcending this world, 
but in the sense of something that, while not a direct object of choices or 
attainable by and in them, can nevertheless be imagined (if imperfectly) and even 
wished for, and so can provide the standards by which choices may reasonably be 
guided.”85  
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Finnis clarifies this in Natural Law and Natural Rights, writing that the basic goods “are 
not abstract forms, they are analytically distinguishable aspects of the well-being, actual 
or possible, of you and me – of flesh-and-blood individuals.”86   
 The modes of responsibility act as intermediate moral principles helping bridge 
the gap between the abstract formulations of the first principle of practical reason (i.e. the 
basic human goods), the first principle of morality (i.e. pursue a possibility that is 
compatible with a will toward integral human fulfillment) and specific moral norms. 
Derived from the first principle of morality, they are not self-evident truths like the 
determinations of the first principle of practical reason.87 
 I think that the formulation of these modes of responsibility is an Achilles’ heel 
for theorists working in the tradition of the new natural law. The derivation is highly 
complex and academic. And while this in itself does disprove the universality and 
rationality of the natural law, it certainly makes it more difficult for laymen to 
comprehend. George himself admits that “the status of the intermediate moral principles 
as derived principles [is], in Natural Law and Natural Rights, unclear.”88  
 In comparison to this obscurity of the secondary modes, the first principle of 
morality is clear enough and powerful enough to rule out all but the extremely gray cases 
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c.f. Finnis, John. Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 
Chapter 5, Grisez, Germain. The Way of the Lord Jesus, Volume I, Christian Moral 
Principles (Chicago, IL: Franciscan Herald, 1983); Finnis, John. Fundamentals of Ethics. 
(Washington, D.C.: Georgetown, 1983), 70; and Finnis, John; Boyle, Joseph; and Grisez, 
Germain. Nuclear Deterrence, Morality and Realism (New York, NY: Oxford, 1987), 
284-278.  
88 George, Robert P. “Criticism of Natural Law Theory.” 55 University of Chicago Law 
Review, (1988), 1399, c.f.  note 69. 
Cassidy 57 
on the margins. To be sure, those margins are exactly where we need an interpretative 
framework (For instance, questions like: When does life start? Does a father have a right 
to favor the lives of his children over strangers? How do we develop a moral right to 
defend ourselves at the expense of another?)89 But for individual conduct in our everyday 
lives, the first principle is, I think, applicable. To restate it in George’s terms, our actions 
should attempt only to instantiate goods in circumstances that do not render the 
realization of integral and holistic human development/fulfillment impossible. This idea 
of pursuing integral human fulfillment also hearkens back to the classical notion of virtue 
as a life of balance.  
 And by deriving this law through an inquiry into practical reason (as opposed to 
identifying a moral normativity in human nature) gives it an objectivity and universality 
that applies to individuals across cultures. This rational basis is the main difference 
between the traditional natural law and the new natural law.  For George and his 
colleagues, “natural law theory needn’t, and, as practiced by its greatest exponents 
[including, for them, Aquinas], hasn’t relied on…the illicit reference from facts to 
norms.”90 In other words, practical reason, in its role guiding human action, is not derived 
from prior assumptions – be they speculative, metaphysical, or theological.  
Whereas old natural law theorists attempted to define the law based on inquiries 
into human nature, the new school abandons this ontological approach in favor of a 
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deontological understanding that claims to “identify principles of moral rectitude 
independently of inquiries into the nature of (human) being(s).”91 In short, from the 
perspective of the new natural law, ought is not inferred from is.92  The incredible gift of 
reason allows humans to participate in the uncovering of the law, then, and also confers 
on them the dignity and rights of free individuals.  
 
VI: A Comparison of the Key Differences between Manion and George 
 
 The natural law writings of Manion and George, to this point, are evidently quite 
different. In Manion, there was little discussion of first principles of practical reasoning 
or modes of responsibility, and George did not lash out at government intrusion against 
individual liberty on the basis of the natural law philosophies of our founding fathers. 
Yet, both do claim a similar background and they share the goal of ensuring American 
stability. Their works then, while distinctive and marked by unique historical settings, do 
have several commonalities.  
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 To better understand this relationship between the writings of Manion and 
George, I will now take a more thorough view of how Manion and George differ in their 
conception of the natural law. There are five main differences, which I will state briefly 
here and then explore in more detail in the pages that follow. First, Manion is much more 
explicit in his invocation of God. Both men are deeply religious (and influential in 
religious circles), but Manion’s formulation of the natural law is much more dependent 
on a belief in God. Secondly, and as a corollary to the first point, George goes to great 
lengths to establish a school of natural law that is purely focused on reason, in fact, the 
first principle of practical reason. Because of this, and this is the third point, George’s 
discussion of the natural law is highly intellectual – at times, even cryptically cerebral.  It 
is no reflection of Manion’s intelligence that his writing anticipates a lay reader, one who 
need not have background in arcane doctrines of moral and political philosophy. (To be 
sure, Manion was actually quite bright. Recall his professorship at the age of twenty-
nine!) Fourthly, Manion is deeply – even obsessively – concerned with preserving the 
freedom (moral and political) of individuals. As we will see, he presumes a sort of 
Burkean “ordered liberty,” but for Dean Manion, there is no greater evil than an 
aggressive and expansive government. And this leads to the final point of distinction, a 
view of a positive as opposed to a negative role of government. This point is perhaps the 
most nuanced in Manion’s writings, as his love for freedom is quite profound, but he 
certainly leaves room for particular government action. George is much less ambiguous 
on this point, writing one book describing how government necessarily plays an active 
role in applying the precepts of the natural law to make men moral.  
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 The first main difference between Manion and George is the former’s often 
unequivocal reliance upon God when arguing about American enactments of the natural 
law (on both a personal and political level).  This confidence is inspired by the position 
that the theological underpinnings of natural law are not a sign of weakness, but the 
source of its strength. And in Manion’s eyes, they are part and parcel of our American 
heritage.  He contends that:  
“Our forefathers were wise enough to see that this indestructible soul was the 
eternal quality that all Americans – indeed all men everywhere – had and have in 
common with one another. Far from making a new God out of “Society” the 
American Revolution was an official public acknowledgement of the one true pre-
existing God, the Creator of all men, and source of all the rights of men. While 
the Europeans were sowing the materialistic winds of their political and economic 
storms, our Founding Fathers were building Americanism upon the firm 
foundations of religious faith.”93  
This heritage makes religion  “the very bloodstream of our legal system.”94 As such, it 
justifies and requires a public appreciation for religion. Although the Supreme Court 
decided Everson v. Board of Education three years before Manion wrote A Key to Peace, 
the eradication of religion from the public sphere was nowhere near complete. Even 
fifteen years later, when the Supreme Court erected the “wall of separation between 
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church and state” in Engel v. Vitale, Manion still whole-heartedly believed in a 
theologically invigorated America. 95 
 His insistence on America’s religious heritage and character help us understand 
his tendency to conflate “the law of Nature and Nature’s God.” For Manion – as for many 
other religious natural law believers – there is no distinction between natural law and 
God’s law. Moreover, any insistence on such a distinction does not give the law more 
force (by universalizing and abstracting it from ties to a specific heritage), but it instead 
weakens it. For this reason, Manion concurs with Aquinas’ formulation of the natural law 
as “man’s participation in the divine.”  
 Manion’s conviction on the religious foundation of the natural law also connects 
to his love of freedom, sanctioning freedom with a divine blessing. He deems liberty a 
“Godly principle” while at the same time claiming that the drive to increase state power 
is “Devil-made.”96 To go one step further, this view assumes God as the author of our 
liberty.  In one newspaper interview, Manion claimed that “American laws are not the 
source of American liberties, but merely the protection for liberties that are etched by 
God into the birth certificate of every human soul.”97 In other words, God’s natural law 
ordains man as a free individual whose duties and restrictions ought not to come from the 
                                                
95 In Everson, the Court incorporated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment 
against the states, and in Engel, the Court ruled that the Establishment Clause forbids a 
public school from reading a nondenominational prayer. Both decisions instituted a long 
line of cases in which the Court attempted to eradicate religion in any form from the 
public sphere.   
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) 
96 Manion, Clarence, The Key to Peace. (Chicago, IL: The Heritage Foundation, Inc., 
1950),  83.  
97 Columbus (GA) Ledger, “Walker Flays Foreign Isms in Talk Here,” (1939). 
Cassidy 62 
state, but are understood to be engraved onto the soul accompanying the liberties that 
Manion so cherished.  
 And according to Manion’s understanding, it was this very view that inspired the 
inception of American liberty. He argues that our “forefathers knew that God must be in 
the government of any people in order to insure them against despotism” and to preserve 
liberty, therefore, (and in turn to enable men to pursue their natural ends autonomously), 
individuals need God.98 In several of his writings, Manion cites Pennsylvania governor 
William Penn who said that “those people who are not governed by God will be ruled by 
tyrants.”99 For Penn, and for Manion, a firm faith in the natural laws of God is the only 
legitimate and “enduring protection for liberty.”100 Freedom in this perspective is not 
based on an abstract natural right, but a God-given right that allows men to follow God’s 
(natural) law. Manion’s frequent interposition of God’s law and natural law makes salient 
the point that for him, there was no difference between the two.   
 With such a theological conception of the natural law, Manion also appreciates 
the role of religion in American public life, an appreciation that perhaps allows him to 
overlook the impact of decisions like Everson. One recalls how Alexis de Tocqueville 
wrote that “While the law permits the Americans to do what they please, religion 
prevents them from conceiving and forbids them to commit what is rash or unjust.”101 
Similarly, for Manion, because the natural law followed closely from a belief in Nature’s 
                                                
98 Manion, Clarence, The Key to Peace. (Chicago, IL: The Heritage Foundation, Inc., 
1950), 35.  
99 See, e.g. Manion, Clarence. Let’s Face It! (South Bend, IN: The Manion Forum, 1956), 
5-6. 
100 Manion, Clarence, The Key to Peace. (Chicago, IL: The Heritage Foundation, Inc., 
1950),  45.  
101 Tocqueville, Alexis de. Democracy in America, (New York, N.Y.: D. Appleton and 
Company, 1904), 329.  
Cassidy 63 
God, religion was not only permissible in public life, but was the very foundation of 
sound, stable, and successful (and free) democratic people.   
 But of course, this theological understanding has obvious disadvantages. 
Foremost among them is the fact that when a community turns away from religion, it 
loses more than just a belief in God.  Aside from the possible deleterious outcomes that 
come from rejecting God, if a community’s freedoms, rights, and duties are understood 
only in theological terms, they too are potentially lost when religion is rejected. This 
point was not lost on Manion who notes that “once the fact of God is completely out of 
the seriously thinking human mind the moral restraints of honesty, justice, charity, and 
compassion each loses its logical and reasonable support. Thereafter, sheer physical 
power becomes the sole arbiter of right and wrong.”102 But there are further 
disadvantages with conflating God’s law and the natural law. For one, it is alienating to 
alternative religions or atheists and agnostics more generally. In a country that is built on 
a diversity of viewpoints and religious freedom, a theologically-inspired moral and 
political norm does not apply. It thus follows that instead of Manion’s belief that a 
religious groundwork sets fast the natural law, in a country that reveres diversity, such a 
groundwork may actually weaken a natural law outlook.   
 For these reasons, many different schools of thought have arisen that seek to 
differentiate natural law precepts from religious assumptions. (The rhetoric of human 
rights is an especially good example of this effort to move away from religious ties). One 
such effort, has been made by George. (N.B. Although George and his fellow new natural 
law theorists lay out a conception of the natural law that is independent from overt 
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references to a specific religion or God in general, most, including George, would agree 
with Manion’s [and Aquinas’s] position that God’s law is the natural law).   
 Instead of a firm reliance on “Nature’s God,” George’s conception of the natural 
law is entirely based in reason.  It is, what fellow new natural lawyer John Finnis calls a 
“view of justice that is not dependent on God.”103 The whole premise of the new natural 
law school is its foundation in man’s practical reasoning. George and his colleagues go to 
great lengths to establish how the basic goods of human life are not deduced from prior 
knowledge of the human condition or even from personal practical experience. They truly 
are the first principles of practical reasoning.  
 Recall how in Aquinas’s terms, the goods have an intrinsic worth that is per se 
nota through the human capacity to reason. They give basic reasons for action and apply 
to all human beings. As such, they merely identify rational action and rule out 
irrationality. So for example, repeatedly opening and closing a door has no ostensible 
rational good as its object, and therefore, to the rational among us, seems unreasonable. 
At the basic level, this is how the natural law is rational.  
 Now, specific moral analysis is also based in reason as the modes of responsibility 
that confer moral norms help us in choosing among rational goods. Rational grasp of the 
intelligibility of human goods leads, indirectly, and through a process of 
intellectual/moral engagement – not of theological/moral reflection – to moral norms. 
Again, this process is carried out through our rational intellect – as for instance, we can 
rationally grasp that fairness demands impartiality among persons or that we ought not to 
enact a certain good in deliberate violation of another.  
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 Keep in mind that “no specific moral norm can be derived immediately from the 
first principle.”104 Rational insight into the first principle merely implies intermediary 
principles that rational beings can then rely on to deduce specific norms. The 
complexities of this derivation process are best understood when contrasted with other 
strands of natural law, such as the neo-scholastic. Whereas that school requires our 
rational intellect acting in its “speculative mode,” George and his colleagues claim that 
the new natural law is completely free from such inquiry and is based on the self-evident 
intelligibility of basic human goods.105 
 Although a comparison with neo-scholasticism helps clarify the new natural law 
position, the latter’s explicit focus on reason is even more evident when contrasted with 
Manion’s natural law. Manion does not attempt to speculate into human nature, nor does 
he identify principles of practical reasoning. For him, the natural law simply stands for an 
implied understanding of common moral norms that come from God and protect our 
freedom. There is simply no effort to intellectualize the theory.  
 If anything, he attacks the view that human action can be grasped by practical 
reasoning.  In contrast to George’s reliance on reason, Manion takes a more Humean 
conception of reason as a slave of the passions. For Manion, “Emotion promptly disarms 
Reason and then proceeds to appropriate its vocabulary.”106  Such a statement appears at 
odds with George’s natural law that is fundamentally based on the human ability to 
identify rational and intelligible reasons for choices and actions. Yet even George 
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concedes that humans do (and at times even should) submit to other authorities of various 
types.  
 Despite this, he confronts the skeptics who deny that it is possible to identify 
basic human goods as rational bases for human choices and actions. It is Manion who 
writes that it is “the prevailing tendency of human nature to feel rather than think.”107 
George is aware of these critics and he acknowledges that emotion plays a role in human 
choices. And, although we are endowed with the capacity to identify the intelligibility of 
human actions, our reason and our conscience can and often do fail us. An intellectual 
failure that leads us astray from the natural law is equally as likely as a moral failure that 
leads to a similar outcome. And our moral (i.e. character) flaws can have the adverse 
effect of blinding our intellect and subduing our capacities for reason.108  
 But all of this is not to say that our capacity to reason does not play the key role in 
the process of human deliberation, judgment, and action. George, for various reasons, 
including a desire to retain an ecumenical (if not secular) spirit that will allow his theories 
to have influence across cultures, wants to make clear that his brand of natural law relies 
upon (the God-given gift of) human rationality.  
 As a consequence of this effort to develop the rational basis of the natural law, 
George’s moral and political philosophy is highly technical. Fr. Ernest Fortin wrote that 
adherents to the theory of the new natural law claim to ascertain with “quasi-
mathematical rigor and determinateness the specific norms by which human choices are 
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to be guided.109 It is true that George’s multi-level analysis draws his readers into a 
technical investigation of the world of practical reasoning that at times seems divorced 
from the real world conundrums that individuals and policymakers face.  He is aware of 
any and all objections to his arguments and entertains critics of all sorts in his writings. 
George’s heavily philosophical and intellectually-serious approach to the natural law 
stands in contrast to what I previously referred to as Manion’s presumed understanding.  
 As if writing after he read a passage from George’s In Defense of Natural Law, 
Manion writes that,  “It is particularly in the field of political ideas that we have lost our 
touch for simplification and substituted complexity.”110 Arguments that for George may 
be unsophisticated, elementary, and underdeveloped are for Manion, clear, concise, and 
influential.  Manion’s audience, just like his radio show following, is presumed to be 
diverse.  In an appraisal to the 1950 version of his A Key to Peace, Norman Vincent Peale 
writes, “it is hoped that this book will be read by leaders of opinion, by students, and 
indeed by every thoughtful person who wants to help preserve the American form of 
Government.” Manion thus limits himself to a certain level of intellectual vigor, perhaps 
giving his arguments greater force.  
 When Manion invokes the natural law, it is only when it’s convenient or 
necessary to his argument. In all of his writing, he never develops a full definition of the 
natural law and unlike George, does not write exclusively on its applications. For these 
reasons, his appeals to the laws of nature are at times inconsistent.  
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 George, by contrast, perhaps aware of the attacks that writers like Manion expose 
themselves to, goes to great lengths to establish and work within a consistent and defined 
intellectual tradition. He persistently alludes to his intellectual predecessors, Grisez, 
Finnis, and Boyle, (in addition to Aquinas and Aristotle), and throughout his work, 
addresses actual and potential interlocutors. The critical response he anticipates makes his 
works more nuanced, but also gives them more of a thoroughly argumentative tone. He is 
aware that his audience is mostly confined to the academy, and he is thus at liberty (or 
perhaps required) to be intricate and pedantic in his writings.  
 While these differences in style are significant and contribute greatly to the 
differing tenor of each argument, the substantive divergences are much more profound. 
These variances start and end with Manion’s love of liberty – his true key to peace.   As  
noted in the above discussion of Manion’s God-centered natural law, the preservation of 
individual freedom is his chief political concern – and he bases this on natural law 
precepts. His argument is that any expansion of state power thwarts the natural freedom 
and therefore the very dignity of individuals.111 In other words, as humans, our nature 
requires that we have freedom and independence to pursue our rightful ends. Therefore, 
to quote Manion, an active government is “always and everywhere…at war with the free, 
God-given nature of man [viz. Manion’s understanding of the natural law]. For that 
reason alone, none of the real, pretended, or promised benefits of State absolutism can 
possibly justify its existence. It is out to destroy man and consequently man must destroy 
it in self defense.”112 
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 Yet Manion’s love of liberty does not preclude a respect for law – in fact, it 
requires law. In this respect, Manion echoes Edmund Burke, who said that, in defending 
liberty, “the only liberty I mean, is a liberty connected with order, and that not only exists 
with order and virtue, but cannot exist at all without them.”113 Such an order, according to 
George, is threatened by the erosion of our public moral ecology. For the professor from 
Princeton, the restoration of this order can and should come through the development of 
public morality, an effort that may thwart certain individual liberties. Manion, at first 
glance, does not believe such a process is necessary, as he holds that the source of this 
Burkean order, and therefore the prerequisite for liberty, is the natural law etched on the 
hearts of man.  
 Here, Manion also channels a Kantian line of reasoning that upholds autonomy as 
the supreme principle of morality. For Manion, liberty is only possible (or desirable) with 
order and law. This etymology of the word “autonomy,” from the Greek roots meaning 
“self” and “rule,” helps demonstrate how freedom and law connect with one another. Our 
very liberty stems from and is made possible by our ability to understand the natural law 
and rely on it as a source for our own self-government, autonomy, or liberty.  For, as 
Manion puts it, “only morally strong, self-disciplined, and self-sacrificing people can 
afford the rare luxury of constitutionally limited government.”114 Liberty, properly 
understood and enacted then, demands self-government. But this independence itself calls 
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for an objective set of norms that man can access to motivate sacrifice, virtue, and 
restraint – necessary qualities for the type of country Manion desires.115 
 Such a conception of liberty as derived from and made possible by the natural law 
entails difficult questions about the role of government.  In Manion’s view, “when any 
part of [man’s] important domain of personal virtue is transferred to the power of the 
government, the transferred part is automatically released from the restraints of morality 
and put into the area of conscienceless coercion.”116 This strong voice against state-
sponsored virtue would seemingly rule out morality laws; something, as noted, which is 
strongly advocated for by Professor George.  
 But Manion does not stop with such a criticism of government-sponsored 
inculcation of virtue. Rather, he states that it actuality violates the natural law, saying that  
“any shrinkage in the area of personal responsibility [i.e. without external coercion] tends 
to frustrate the purpose for which man was created. Man is here to be tested for his free 
compliance with the moral law of God.”117 Although in some respects, George would 
agree with this,118 Manion undeniably denies the proposition that government can make 
men good.  
 But the question then becomes, although government may not be capable of 
making men good, does it still have a role in the process? To be clear, Manion sees the 
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natural law as a check on government. Recall his prolonged discussion of the higher law 
heritage of the American founding. It was an appeal to the natural law in opposition to 
legislative absolutism that was the impetus behind America’s revolution. And so it is 
today. Manion constantly argues in favor of a limited government that is subject to the 
checks of the natural law. Paraphrasing Thomas Paine, Manion contends that, “those 
people are governed best are those governed least.”119 To go further, he argues that any 
governmental growth “gradually destroys that sense of individual conscientious 
responsibility which…is the mainspring of our general welfare.”120  
 Thus, just as in the American Revolution, the higher law can be called upon to 
check unwarranted government encroachment. Reminiscent of Sophocles’s Antigone or 
Martin Luther King’s “Letter from the Birmingham Jail,” Manion states that “when 
authorities go beyond [their defined powers], their acts are ultra vires and consequently 
void.”121 Such a view can be characterized as “negative” in that it puts limits on the 
legitimate role of government. And it fits well with a traditional understanding of the 
constitutional heritage of the national government.  Manion advocates a natural-law 
based and “continuous, strict, and closely guarded [limitation] upon the power of 
government.”122 Not only is this the permissible conception of American democracy, it is 
also the most effective.  
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 In short, for Manion, “Government cannot make men good.”123 And such an 
effort can be the dangerous pretext for the submission of individual liberty to the whims 
of the state. Manion believes that statism can be  “brutal or benevolent, cruel or 
compassionate” but a strong state “always and everywhere is the embodiment of 
tyrannical, capricious and unlimited government whose subjects are legally powerless to 
resist its decrees.”124 He is ever wary of paternalistic government, arguing that 
“despotism never advertises itself as such. Invariably it is a wolf in sheep’s clothing.”125 
Allowing for any sort of moralistic legislation sets a dangerous precedent for future 
generations. If it ever is, government will not always be in the hands of angels, so 
allowing intrusive action now – even if one agrees with its aims – threatens liberty for 
posterity.  
 Yet having said all of this, Manion does write that the “object direction and 
purpose [of American law] happens to be the ultimate eternal life of the God-created 
human souls with whom American law deals, for whom it functions and by whom it has 
been made.”126 Although this rhetoric is foreign to our current political discourse, Manion 
seemingly believes that government ought to play a role in the improvement of human 
souls.  
 In this effort, however, it is not prudent to rely on government morals legislation. 
In fact, the opposite is true. What Manion (and, I believe, what George too) calls for is 
the fostering of individual morality, according to the precepts of the natural law. Not only 
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is this in line with the American heritage of limited government, it also ennobles man, 
giving him the responsibility, in accordance with the right, to follow the natural law. 
Beyond this, reliance on individuals following the natural law of their own accord 
strengthens the stability and wellbeing of society.  In Manion’s words, “The direction of a 
more acutely developed sense of individual conscientious responsibility…[is necessary] 
for the permanent improvement in the ordered general welfare of our society.”127 
 But the question of how far Manion and George really differ is not totally 
resolved in Manion’s adherence to the principle of natural law as purely a limit on the 
government. In the same article he wrote in praise of the founders’ natural law 
background, Manion states, “Human government…is limited by the law of God.”128 True, 
he uses the word “limited,” but his condition “by the law of God” may make Manion 
sympathetic to (if not categorically in favor of) many of George’s arguments for the 
proactive role of government.129 
 George’s work does wonders in legitimizing moral legislation though his 
development of new natural law theory and what he calls a public “moral ecology.” For 
this reason, despite its statist tendencies, a morally active state might appeal to Manion’s 
sense of the proper role of government. Such conjectures are purely speculative, but 
Manion’s conservative encomiums for order, stability, and religiosity in the American 
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republic may give these two natural lawyers more similarity than is evident at first 
glance.  
 Manion’s allowance for morals legislation can be inferred from such passages as 
when he fondly cites George Mason’s arguing of the case of Robin v. Hardaway before 
the Virginia General Court.130  Mason states: 
“all acts of legislation apparently contrary to natural rights and justice are in our 
laws and must be in the nature of things, considered as void. The laws of nature 
are the laws of God, Whose authority can be superseded by no power on earth. A 
legislature must not obstruct our obedience to Him from whose punishments they 
cannot protect us. All human constitutions which contradict His laws are in 
conscience bound to disobey.”131  
Although this interpretation of the natural law says nothing of basic human goods and 
nothing about the proactive role of government, it does imply that governments must 
know and pursue “the good” as mandated by the laws of nature. This is not far at all from 
George’s conception of the natural law as a duty or obligation that all persons and 
governments must observe.  
 Furthermore, one can infer an allowance of government promotion of natural law 
morality from Manion’s comparison of a community of saints with the American 
population. In the former, “the Moral Law would be the only law needed to provide such 
a community with perfect peace, complete order and universal justice. It is only when 
such a community is invaded by amoral or immoral people – or when some of the saints 
fall from grace – that manmade regulations are required to hold the immoral or amoral 
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elements in line.”132 Americans, whatever their virtues, are not saints. We continually fall 
short of even our own expectations and therefore, Manion seems to envision a proper role 
for state-sponsored morality assistance. Such a view would hold that government would 
be within its proper bounds if it “merely extends and reinforces the observance of those 
rights and duties which stem from the Ten Commandments.”133 And in some ways, as 
Manion contends, when we have lost the moral courage and strength to follow the natural 
law, government becomes our subsidiary moral structural support. But without an 
individual moral capacity, our turn to government inevitably puts our liberty in jeopardy.  
 Therefore, despite several clues to the contrary, Manion’s conception of public 
morality is widely different from George’s.  Manion argues that “when the door is 
opened to let in the interest of the ‘public as a whole’ liberty goes out ultimately if not 
immediately.”134 Therefore, we must remember to “render unto Caesar the things that are 
Caesar’s and to God the things that are God’s.”135 There is a distinct barrier between 
proper governmental activity and the “wide domain of our God-imposed personal 
responsibilities.”136 Despite the coalition of God’s law with the natural law, government 
ought not overstep itself and violate what for Manion is the supreme precept of the 
natural law: individual liberty.  For the “virtue of even the best government is no 
adequate protection for the free nature of men.”137  
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 But to add one more complication to this discussion, we must consider the time 
and place in which Manion was writing. Recall that the vulgarization of mass media, the 
glorification of sex and violence, and the “liberationism” of the 1960’s had not yet 
occurred. Although not a Puritan community, American public morality (in some, if not 
all measures, recall, for example, the racism that dominated the pre-Brown era) was 
largely intact.  Therefore, government did not have the Georgian role of inculcating a 
public moral ecology. Rather, government policy necessitated the protection of God’s 
law (which, of course for Manion, was and is the natural law). Manion argues thus, that:  
“the position of man-made government is completely subordinated to the divine 
end for which each man and all were created by God. Government, or the state if 
you please, is definitely assigned to the inferior but important role of man's agent 
for the protection of God's gifts. This agency extends to all of our law and all of 
the officers of our law from the traffic policeman on the corner to the President of 
the United States. All of these are charged with the single duty of safeguarding 
God's gifts to mankind.”138  
The goal of this outlook is a preservation, as opposed to a creation, of morality. Had 
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VII: Conclusion – A Reconciliation  
 
 Notre Dame Law Professor Charles Rice has outlined two distinct “roles” for the 
natural law in the public sphere: a constructive role and a critical role. These roles 
characterize the natural law philosophies of Professor George and Dean Manion. In its 
constructive role, the natural law can be applied as a guide for the enactment of laws to 
promote the common good (to take a relatively uncontroversial example, reforming 
divorce law in order to protect children). In such a role, the natural law is not a step-by-
step formulaic handbook, but rather a guide, a principled set of arguments that can direct 
discussion and policy debates. This role mirrors the natural law/public morality themes 
espoused by George. 
 In its critical role, by contrast, the natural law may be seen as a negative 
restriction on government, giving individuals in society an absolute standard for limits on 
the state and a rational criterion by which they can evaluate the justice of a law. This is 
the view of the natural law held by Antigone in Sophocles’s classical play, and the 
authority to which Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. appealed in his “Letter from the 
Birmingham Jail.” And this conception of the natural law mirrors Manion’s view on the 
subject.  In this respect, the natural law is a higher law that sets the boundaries for the 
legal system and for the limits of government policy, protecting the liberty of individuals. 
It is important to note, however, that in characterizing these two roles of the natural law, 
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Professor Rice does not portray them contradictorily, but rather, as complementary.139 
There is no reason why a doctor, for instance, cannot appeal to natural law in supporting 
a law that aims to restrict euthanasia (following the law’s constructive role) and refusing 
to perform abortions at a publicly-funded clinic (following the law’s critical role).  
 In these complementary roles, the natural law guards against both legal positivism 
and extreme moral relativism. As a basis for determining what is just and unjust, the 
natural law protects against  “unrestrained utilitarianism and positivism.”140  Where man 
is the origin of all law and there is no higher check on that authority, government is 
pushed towards fascism or communism. Likewise, as soon as a political community loses 
touch with a standard for judging what is true or what leads to “the good,” in favor of 
revering only that which is most powerful, or most efficient, man is reduced in his dignity 
and freedom to a unit in a social system that exists not for him, but in spite of him.  
 The extreme example of Nazi Germany is excessive, yet still useful in examining 
the danger of the complete abandonment of natural law concepts of human freedom and 
human dignity in favor of acute legal positivism. And in its extremity, it still offers 
critical insight as to how a culture that loses sight of these values can quickly disintegrate 
into horror.  In articulating the danger of the Nazi euthanasia program, Dr. Leo 
Alexander, an American medical expert in the Nuremberg Trials, wrote that the program,  
“started with the acceptance of the attitude, basic in the euthanasia movement, 
that there is such a thing as life not worthy to be lived. This attitude in its early 
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stages concerned itself merely with the severely and chronically sick. Gradually 
the sphere of those included in this category was enlarged to encompass the 
socially unproductive, the ideologically unwanted, the racially unwanted and 
finally all non-Germans. But it is important to realize that the infinitely small 
wedged-in lever from which this entire trend of mind received its initial impetus 
was the attitude toward the nonrehabilitable sick.”141  
 It is a slippery slope, that, once engaged, leaves the state authorized to curtail 
individual freedom and dignity in favor of efficiency or pure bigotry. Fortunately, in 
American history, this country has long proclaimed a higher law tradition – asserted by 
the founding fathers in the Declaration of Independence. As Manion reminds us, “It was 
precisely on [the principle of the natural law] that the American Revolution was fought 
and the independence of the American Republic accomplished.”142 This higher law 
heritage protects American democracy and authorizes the supremacy of the free and 
equal individual.  
 Yet, considering the difficulties I outlined in the first section of this paper, 
contemporary American democracy seems unreceptive if not downright hostile to the 
natural law in the public sphere. While these objections to a public natural law paradigm 
surely do exist, from another point of view, the natural law is best made possible in a 
democratic society like the United States.  The natural law depends on such a society that 
reveres the freedom and rationality of its citizens, seeing them as the authority for 
individual conduct and social policymaking.  America, with the equality she presumes of 
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her citizens in the Declaration of Independence, in this sense is not opposed to a natural 
law framework, but the ideal polity for its instantiation.  The United States is the land that 
proclaims that  “all men are created equal” and as such, all possess equal rights and 
dignity. A theory based in the natural law also sees men as free and dignified. This free 
and dignified nature stems from man’s condition as a moral agent who is liberated under 
the laws of man and, if one believes, under the grace of God, yet is bound by a 
transcendent moral order, intelligible to him through the natural law.  This belief in the 
intrinsic worth of human beings that is part and parcel of American democracy not only 
correlates with democratic government, but is the foundation for a public role for the 
natural law.  
 The natural law and democratic government presume that humans, as citizens, are 
rationally enlightened authors of their own fate. The natural law is based on the 
presupposition that human beings can access its precepts through their reason. And a 
vibrant democracy, with its belief in the marketplace of ideas, local participation, and 
transparency and accountability in government, assumes that citizens can intellectually 
grasp and address the problems and possibilities a society faces.  
 To properly reintroduce the natural law into American politics in a way that 
would instantiate the public moral effects George seeks while also preserving the 
freedom of the individual that Manion wants to protect, we must also rely on this faith in 
human reason. All laws have some theoretical, philosophical, ideological, or moral 
framework behind them. It can be unknown, ignored, or implicit, but to deny that such 
paradigms exist is erroneous.  
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 And if we recognize the human capacity to reason, discuss, and debate in the 
public sphere, we can acknowledge how all laws and public policy decisions have deep-
seated roots in such frameworks.  To critically engage these philosophical backgrounds 
of our laws is the responsibility not only of judges, lawyers, or elected policymakers, but 
also of every individual citizen in a democracy.  
 The efforts of engaging the philosophical background of all laws will have 
positive effects on its own. Such discussions, which ought not to be limited to any sector 
of society, will reintroduce ideas of public morality into public discourse. Then, whether 
or not the natural law is a basis for the morals legislation as George recommends, it will 
have served its job by challenging and potentially reinforcing the moral authorities of the 
family, the church, and other lower-level units of society.  In this capacity, however, 
following the role envisioned by St. Thomas, the natural law at its most active would be 
promoting virtue, not requiring it absolutely.143 Moreover, because it relies upon the 
activity of individual citizens participating in American government, it respects the limits 
of state authority and the freedom of individual citizens. By acknowledging the 
philosophical underpinnings of public laws, American democracy will renew its finest 
features – inculcating an ordered liberty that fosters individual and communal flourishing.  
 While permitting theories with implicit moral underpinnings like rights-based 
liberalism, consequentialism, or legal pragmatism, for instance, some may object to 
including the natural law as a legitimate option for a basis of public lawmaking because it 
is so blatantly a theory of morality. Because adherents to the natural law readily declare 
that the natural law governs the moral world just like natural laws govern the physical 
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world, opponents write the theory off as being too heavy-handed and paternalistic.  Yet, 
to exclude a doctrine like the natural law for whatever reason diminishes the vibrancy of 
the engagement of legal philosophy and weakens the forum for policy debate.  A robust 
civic discourse on the philosophy and morality behind public laws should help subdue the 
fear that some have of a religious state in the image of Iran arising in America. An on-
going critical analysis of our laws acknowledges that any basis for public policy is one 
that renders a moral judgment, and the natural law is just one among others that attempts 
to serve as this framework.  
 Moreover, although the natural law is explicitly moral, as a common ground for 
political and moral discussion and debate, it does not violate the American value of 
diversity. Rather, the natural law upholds diversity as a prerequisite and a natural 
outcome of a political discussion. As the natural law points us toward human fulfillment 
and integral flourishing, it assumes such goals as being naturally variegated and diverse. 
In fact, to borrow from George’s thoughts on the basic human goods, the goods of 
sociability and friendship, for instance, demand such ideals as diversity and variability.  
 Thomas Aquinas tells us that the natural law cannot be written law – and both 
Manion and George agree that laws in themselves cannot make men moral.  Yet the 
natural law, for all three men, can and should function as a reference point that guides 
individuals and societies in their pursuit of the good.  As a set of general principles that 
directs our actions towards ourselves and others, it mandates respect for the human 
person – both as a rational moral agent and as a free human being.  Human reason and 
freedom are the defining features of human life and the sources of human dignity. They 
ensure the capacity humans enjoy to pursue truth and virtue. Thus the freedom that 
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Manion lauds and the reason George relies on are not in opposition, but constitutive 
aspects of a whole that allows for man to be fully man. And they are best enacted in a 
democratic government. With this in mind, one understands how it is the natural law that 
makes moral questioning and deliberation possible.144 
 Disagreement on questions of morality and public policy can, do, and should 
emerge. The debate and disagreement among politicians, theologians, ethicists, and 
philosophers presumes a natural law view of man as rational and free. And, although it is 
at times frustrating to investigate a theory of absolute truth like the natural law and be led 
down paths that diverge at every clearing, I have faith that it is a worthy journey. And it 
is a journey that mirrors the pursuit of truth in life. Neither yields answers that are clear 
and easy. Yet, as Socrates reminds us in Plato’s Apology:  
“I tell you that to let no day pass without discussing goodness and all the other 
subjects about which you hear me talking and examining both myself and others 
is really the very best thing that a man can do, and that life without this sort of 
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Although by no means extensive, the following are selected passages from influential 
minds of Western thought who supported various formulations of the natural law. Such a 
compilation is merely to serve as further evidence for the widespread belief in the natural 
law.  As Alfred Cobban notes, a survey of these thinkers points to the position that 
natural law has “provided the soil in which the fundamental ideals of Western civilization 
grew up.” (Cobban, Alfred. “The Return of Natural Law,” in The Crisis of Civilization 
(London: J. Cape, 1941), 86). 
• Cicero, anticipating the claims of future religiously-motivated natural law thinkers, 
wrote that “Law did not then begin to be when it was put into writing, but when it 
arose, that is to say at the same moment with the mind of God.” He continued, 
claiming “Law is the highest reason, implanted in nature, which commands those 
things which ought to be done and prohibits the reverse…The highest law was born in 
all the ages before any law was written or State was formed… We are by Nature 
inclined to love mankind which is the foundation of law.” (Cicero, De Legibus, in 
Holland, Thomas Erskine. The Elements of Jurisprudence, 10th ed. (New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press, 1906), 32.) 
• Capturing the wider sense of the term, the Roman jurist Ulpian spoke of a natural law 
that “prevails among animals as well as men, regulating the nurture of the young and 
the union of the sexes” (Ulpian, Iust. Inst. in Holland, Thomas Erskine. The Elements 
of Jurisprudence, 10th ed. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1906), 33).  
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• In general, the Roman system of “ius gentium” (law of nations) that was generated to 
govern commercial relations among the Romans and other people they came into 
contact with. This system of positive law was based on “a body of principles which 
are found in the laws of all nations, and which therefore point to a similarity in the 
needs and ideas of all peoples” (Holland, Thomas Erskine. The Elements of 
Jurisprudence, 10th ed. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1906), 35; cf: 
Cicero De Officiis).  
• Sir Edward Coke, an influential seventeenth-century MP and jurist wrote that “The 
law of nature is that which God at the time of creation of the nature of man infused 
into his heart, for his preservation and direction; and this is Lex aeterna, the moral 
law, called also the law of nature” (Corwin, Edward. The “Higher Law” Background 
of American Constitutional Law. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), 46).  
• Sir William Blackstone, perhaps the most influential figure in the documentation of 
English common law tradition wrote that “This law of nature, being co-eval with 
mankind and dictated by God himself, is of course superior in obligation to any other. 
It is binding all over the globe in all countries and at all times: no human laws are of 
any validity, if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid derive all their force, 
and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from their original” (Blackstone, Sir 
William. Commentaries on the laws of England, Volume 1. (Chicago, IL: University 
of Chicago Press, 1979), 63).  
• Although often conflated with conservative politics, the natural law is not necessarily 
and inherently conservative in practice. One of the most influential progressive 
thinker of history, Martin Luther King, Jr., in his Letter from Birmingham Jail  
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appealed to a higher authority, writing that “A just law is a man-made code that 
squares with the moral law or the law of God… An unjust law is a human law that is 
not rooted in eternal law and natural law.” (King, Martin Luther, Jr. “Letter from 
Birmingham Jail.” The Norton Anthology of African American Literature. Ed. Henry 
Louis Gates, Jr. and Nellie Y. McKay. (New York: Norton, 1997)).  
• One can also compare this passage from MLK with Thomas Aquinas’s discussion of 
unjust laws in Summa Theologica. See, specifically, Question 96, Article 4.  
• Thomas Jefferson, the primary writer of the Declaration of Independence, wrote of a 
firm moral code ingrained in human nature. Man, as a social being was “endowed 
with a sense of right and wrong, merely relative to this [role]. This sense is as much a 
part of his nature, as the sense of hearing, seeing, feeling; it is the true foundation of 
morality...The moral sense, or conscience, is as much a part of man as his leg or arm. 
It is given to all human beings in a stronger or weaker degree, as force of members is 
given them in a greater or less degree. It may be strengthened by exercise, as may any 
particular limb of the body. This sense is submitted, indeed, in some degree, to the 
guidance of reason; but it is a small stock which is required for this…” (Jefferson, 
Thomas to Carr, Peter. Personal Letter, 1787. Available: 
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